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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
USING A CHANGE-DETECTION TASK TO SIMULATE DIVIDED PERCEPTION 
AND ITS EFFECTS ON RECOGNITION MEMORY FOR OBJECTS 
 
Déjà vu is defined as high levels of familiarity for objects or situations that are 
objectively unfamiliar.  One theory of déjà vu is that objects viewed under conditions of divided 
perception can later evoke familiarity.  The present study examined whether a change detection 
task could simulate divided perception and affect later recognition memory performance for 
changed items.  Participants viewed a study list in which one version of a scene alternated once 
with another version of the same scene, but with one item missing.  Participants attempted to 
determine the location of the change.  On a subsequent test list, participants viewed items from 
the scenes in isolation and made recognition judgments on them.  Across five experiments, this 
task was used to determine how detection status affected familiarity ratings, how stimulus 
characteristics affect familiarity ratings, and what recognition processes (i.e., recollection and 
familiarity) drive recognition decisions for undetected items.  Overall, these experiments show 
that simulated conditions of divided perception do affect recognition memory, which is a first 
step towards investigating déjà vu directly. 
Bogdan Kostic 
Psychology Department 
Colorado State University 







A recognition decision is a judgment of prior occurrence—it is determining whether an 
item or event had been encountered before (Mandler, 1980).  Dual-process theories of recognition 
memory (Yonelinas, 2002) state that recognition can take place by way of two separate processes: 
recollection and familiarity.  Recollection is the act of bringing to mind specific details about an 
event.  For example, on encountering a person on the street, recalling an instance when that 
person had been encountered before would help one to determine that the person is an 
acquaintance.  Familiarity is the general feeling one gets that something or someone was 
encountered before, potentially in the absence of any specific details.  On meeting the 
hypothetical person on the street, even if one cannot recall meeting the person before, the person 
could be recognized on the basis of just ―seeming very familiar.‖ 
Déjà vu is a phenomenon characterized by very strong feelings of having been 
somewhere or done something before, despite evidence to the contrary (Brown, 2004).  Some 
evidence suggests that déjà vu may represent a type of familiarity-based recognition (e.g., Cleary, 
2008; Cleary, Ryals & Nomi, 2009). 
 The purpose of this study is to evaluate the Divided Perception theory of déjà vu by 
simulating divided perception with the change blindness phenomenon, then measuring familiarity 
and recognition memory performance for undetected items.  There are established laboratory 
paradigms for studying familiarity, whereas the study of déjà vu in laboratory settings is 
relatively new. Therefore, a first step toward investigating theories of déjà vu is to investigate 
whether they apply to familiarity.  This approach has been used by other researchers interested in 
the study of déjà vu (e.g., Brown & Marsh, 2008, 2009).   
First, the introduction will review some of the main findings in the area of familiarity-
based recognition, and describe how they relate to the déjà vu experience.  There will also be a 
description of the Divided Perception theory of déjà vu, and how it can be tested using existing 
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methods of studying familiarity. Then, in relation to the Divided Perception theory, there will be a 
section reviewing the findings and theory behind the change blindness phenomenon, focusing on 
the influence of change detection on later recognition memory. This section will argue that the 
change-blindness phenomenon presents a means of investigating the Divided Perception theory.  
Data from five experiments will explore recognition memory performance for items that were or 
were not detected in a change detection task.  The General Discussion will include discussions of 
what these results mean for change blindness and recognition memory, and their implications for 
the Divided Perception Theory of déjà vu.  
Familiarity and Recognition Memory 
In order to examine the role of familiarity in recognition memory, one must isolate 
familiarity processes from recollection processes.  One method of doing this is by using the 
recognition-without-identification (RWI) paradigm (e.g., Cleary & Greene, 2000; Peynircioglu, 
1990).  The RWI effect is the finding that participants‘ familiarity ratings discriminate between 
old and new stimuli even when participants cannot say what those stimuli are.  An example of the 
procedure starts with participants studying a list of words.  A test list immediately follows, in 
which word fragments appear.  Half of the word fragments correspond to studied words, and the 
other half correspond to unstudied words.  After each word fragment appears, participants are 
asked to attempt to complete the word fragment and then rate its familiarity (i.e., the likelihood 
that the word fragment corresponds to a studied word).  Typical results are that familiarity ratings 
are significantly higher for studied words than unstudied words, even when participants cannot 
successfully identify the word fragment.  This basic effect has been demonstrated using written 
words (Cleary & Greene, 2001; Cleary, 2004), spoken words (Cleary, Winfield, & Kostic, 2007), 
music (Kostic & Cleary, 2009), line drawings (Cleary, Langley, & Seiler, 2004), scenes (Cleary 
& Reyes, 2009), and analogical relationships (Kostic, Cleary, Severin, & Miller, 2010).  Cleary 
and Greene (2000) performed a ―reverse‖ modification of this procedure in which participants 
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identify word fragments at study rather than test, and participants then attempt to discriminate, via 
familiarity ratings, between whole test words that appeared as fragments at study and whole test 
words that did not.  RWI in this case is the finding that among test words whose fragments went 
unidentified at study, ratings are higher at test than for words whose fragments were not studied.  
One of the uses of the RWI paradigm is to determine what features of stimuli can be used 
in familiarity-based recognition decisions.  In Cleary‘s (2004) study, participants received a series 
of words at study and then test words that shared a common orthography with the study words, 
but different meanings (e.g., Cheetoh and Cheetah).  Even when participants could not recall the 
similarly-spelled words from study, the test words that orthographically resembled studied words 
received higher familiarity ratings.  Similar findings occurred for test words that shared common 
phonologies with study words but different orthographies (e.g., Eighty and Lady) as well as test 
words that shared common meanings with study words but different orthographies and 
phonologies (e.g., Cheetah and Jaguar).  These findings revealed some of the features of words 
that drive familiarity.  The same basic procedure revealed that phoneme features drive familiarity 
in spoken words (Cleary et al., 2007), geon features drive familiarity in line drawings (Cleary et 
al., 2004), pitch and rhythm drive familiarity in music (Kostic & Cleary, 2009), and analogical 
resemblance drives familiarity in word pairs (Kostic et al., 2010).  
Another paradigm that has been used to study recollection and familiarity is the 
Remember-Know procedure (Tulving, 1985).  In this procedure, participants provide 
―Remember‖ or ―Know‖ responses to items on a recognition memory test.  Remember responses 
indicate recollection of the study episode, while Know responses indicate a sense of familiarity 
for the item without any accompanying recollection.  Tulving showed that participants can 
understand the distinction and use the terms to report their different bases of recognition 
decisions.  Although one of the major criticisms of this approach is that Remember and Know 
responses are fundamentally subjective, Gardiner (2001) argues that these responses are still 
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useful to science because their accuracy can be compared against objective recognition decisions.  
Gardiner also argues that some independent variables (such as levels of processing) affect 
remembering but not knowing, and other variables (such as study and test modalities) affect 
knowing but not remembering.  Gardiner claims that these results show that the measures are 
independent and can be experimentally manipulated in different ways, in spite of the fact they are 
subjective assessments.  Diana, Reder, Arndt, and Park (2006) also report a number of 
dissociations between Remember and Know, and Yonelinas (2002) reported that process 
dissociations procedures (e.g., Jacoby, 1991) produce proportions of recollection- and familiarity-
based responses comparable to what is found using Remember-Know.  In other words, the 
subjective nature of Remember-Know responses were verified with objective measures.  
Déjà vu 
Cleary (2008) argues that feelings of familiarity in recognition decisions are an integral 
part of the déjà vu experience.  Déjà vu is a commonly-used term, but the nature of this 
experience is somewhat unclear.  Titchener (1928) writes ―Most of us, probably, have an 
occasional acquaintance with what is called paramnesia or wrong recognition: a definite ‗feeling 
that all this has happened before,‘…in spite of the fact and the knowledge that the experience is 
novel‖ (p. 187).  Currently, there is relatively little research on déjà vu in psychology, but when 
déjà vu is discussed it is often described as an inappropriate feeling of familiarity in a situation 
that is objectively unfamiliar or new (Brown, 2003, 2004).  An example of this would be visiting 
a foreign country for the first time and feeling as though one had been there before.  There are 
many possibilities for why déjà vu occurs, with the most likely possibility being that déjà vu is a 
product of recognition memory processes (Cleary, 2008).  Brown (2004) states that there is 
currently no procedure that has been shown to reliably evoke full-blown déjà vu experiences, and 
that such a procedure may never exist (although see Kovacs et al., 2009, for a possible exception).  
However, what can be done is to set up conditions like those proposed in different theories and 
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determine whether feelings of familiarity vary in accordance with theory.  Because there are 
established laboratory paradigms for studying feelings of familiarity, testing the effect of various 
manipulations on familiarity is likely a more productive (if less direct) method of studying déjà 
vu.  Nevertheless, it has been suggested that déjà vu experiences likely range from brief and weak 
to persistent and strong (Sno, Schalken, & de Jonghe, 1992), so increases in familiarity could 
perhaps be seen as a type of weak déjà vu experience. 
 In spite of the fact that déjà vu is poorly understood, there is evidence that the 
experiences are relatively common.  In a review, Brown (2003) reports survey data showing the 
following characteristics of déjà vu experiences:  Two-thirds of people have experienced déjà vu 
at least once in their lives, and people who have experienced it at least once tend to experience it 
more than once.  A normal experience lasts several seconds.  Rates of occurrence vary across 
individuals; some people experience déjà vu only several times throughout their lives, while other 
people experience déjà vu several times each month or week.  Déjà vu experiences are more 
common in people with higher levels of education and income.  There are no consistent gender 
differences, although rates of déjà vu do vary across the lifespan.  Specifically, the frequency of 
déjà vu experiences decreases in older adults, but déjà vu experiences are also less common for 
adults younger than 20.  
Déjà vu and familiarity 
If a déjà vu experience is characterized by a feeling of familiarity for something that is 
objectively new, there are a number of recognition memory procedures that produce similar 
effects.  Jacoby, Woloshyn, and Kelley (1989) demonstrated how to make a name ―become 
famous‖ by manipulating familiarity.  Jacoby et al. presented participants with a list of 
nonfamous names (e.g., Sebastian Weisdorf) under full or divided attention, and later presented 
participants with another list of names in which both famous and nonfamous names appeared.  
Some of the nonfamous names appeared earlier, and some were ―new‖ nonfamous names.  For 
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each name, participants were asked to judge whether the name was famous or not (as a gauge of 
familiarity) and also to indicate whether each name on the test list appeared on the study list (a 
recognition decision).  This procedure lead participants to provide more fame judgments for 
nonfamous names that were presented earlier compared to nonfamous names that did not appear 
earlier.  Also, conditions of divided attention caused participants to be less accurate in their 
recognition decisions, but fame judgments (familiarity) were not affected.  In sum, the fact that 
nonfamous names can be judged as famous provides one example of how objectively new things 
can appear familiar in situations when they should not. 
Another study relevant to déjà vu is Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989).  In several 
experiments, participants saw a list of study words.  Participants later saw a test list in which half 
the words were studied and half were unstudied, and every test word was preceded by a context 
word which was either a matching (same) word or a mismatching (different) word.  There was 
also a baseline condition, in which the symbol ―xoxoxox‖ appeared in place of a context word.  
Finally, presentation duration of the context word/baseline symbol varied as to be fast or slow so 
that participants would be unaware or aware, respectively, that something appeared before the test 
word.  Participants were simply asked to categorize each word as ―old‖ or ―new,‖ depending on 
whether it appeared in the study list.  Their results were that fast presentation of matching context 
words lead participants to call new words ―old‖ more often, but the opposite is true for slow 
presentation of matching context words.  Jacoby and Whitehouse interpreted this as showing that 
a matching context word enhances familiarity of the test word, and if participants are unaware of 
the source of the familiarity (due to fast presentation of the context word), it will be misattributed 
to mean that the word appeared earlier.  However, if participants are aware of the context word, 
the familiarity will not be misattributed.  (See Huber, Clark, Curran, & Winkielman, 2008, for an 
alternative interpretation).  This procedure provides another demonstration of how participants 
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can experience familiarity for items that are objectively unfamiliar, which Jacoby and 
Whitehouse related to déjà vu experiences.  
More direct investigations of déjà vu include a study by Brown and Marsh (2007) using 
symbols of low, medium, and high pre-experimental familiarity.  Participants were presented with 
two symbols simultaneously (either Low with Medium or High with Medium) or one symbol 
(always Medium) and then asked to rate the familiarity of the Medium-Familiarity symbol.  
(Participants were not told which symbols were low, medium, or high in familiarity).  Results 
showed that when a Medium-Familiarity symbol was paired with a Low-Familiarity symbol, this 
decreased familiarity ratings compared to when the Medium-Familiarity symbol appeared alone.  
Likewise, pairing the Medium-Familiarity symbol with a High-Familiarity symbol increased 
ratings.  The authors‘ interpretation was that the familiarity of one object in a scene can increase 
or decrease the familiarity of other objects in that scene.  Brown and Marsh (2009) again used 
symbols of high, medium, and low familiarity in a Jacoby-Whitehouse procedure to show that 
rapidly flashing an identical prime greatly increases the likelihood that participants will indicate 
that low- and novel-familiarity symbols were encountered prior to the experiment.  This provides 
a means by which objectively unfamiliar symbols can appear familiar.  In addition, Brown and 
Marsh (2009) reported that 79% of their participants were occasionally confused about whether 
they had encountered the symbols prior to the experiment, and 50% of the participants reported 
actually experiencing déjà vu.  
Brown and Marsh (2008) also examined whether the manipulations similar to those used 
by Jacoby and collaborators could be used to create feelings of familiarity in an autobiographical 
context.  Participants viewed pictures of a college campus they had never visited.  During this 
first exposure, participants engaged in a shallow level of processing for each photograph which 
consisted of detecting a cross embedded somewhere in the scene.  After a delay of one to three 
weeks participants were exposed to the photographs again and asked whether they had ever 
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visited each scene at some point in their lives.  Upon this second exposure, participants reported 
experiencing higher familiarity for the pictures of campuses they had never visited, and even 
caused participants to believe they had visited those campuses before, due to the fact they could 
not recall having only viewing the scenes.  Brown and Marsh again found that nearly half the 
participants reported experiencing feelings of déjà vu at some point during the experiment. 
Cleary et al. (2009) provided compelling evidence that the global configuration of a 
scene, rather than any individual item in the scene, can produce feelings of familiarity that are 
likely involved in déjà vu.  Cleary et al. presented participants with a study list of line drawings of 
scenes.  On a subsequent test list, participants viewed a test list of all new scenes, half of which 
shared an overall configuration with a studied scene.  As each test scene appeared, participants 
were asked to recall a study scene with a similar configuration and provide familiarity ratings for 
each test scene.  Participants were also asked to indicate whether they were experiencing any 
feelings of déjà vu.  Results showed that even when participants could not recall a configurally 
similar study scene, participants gave higher familiarity ratings to test scenes that shared a 
configuration with a study scene.  Participants were also more likely to report being in a déjà vu 
state while viewing the test scenes that configurally resembled study scenes. 
The preceding section suggests several ways in which déjà vu might be related to 
familiarity-based discrimination, and several studies show evidence of déjà vu-like experiences 
resulting from laboratory procedures.  Cleary (2008) explains how déjà vu could simply be the 
experience of recognizing a situation as familiar without identifying the source of the familiarity, 
in ways similar to manipulations of familiarity like those described in this section.  Déjà vu could 
either result from a high degree of overlap with one prior situation, or a lesser degree of overlap 
with several different situations.  The theories in the following section explore this concept in 
more specific detail. 
The Divided Perception Theory of Déjà vu 
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 Brown (2003) suggests several potential explanations for why déjà vu occurs.  The 
different theories range from possibilities involving cognitive processes out of sync to biological 
dysfunction, but the theories most relevant to familiarity-based recognition are from a class of 
memory explanations, such as implicitly finding something familiar without explicitly recalling 
why or how.   
One theory of the cause of déjà vu involves attention or perception.  Brown (2003) 
provides a quote by Titchener (1928): 
You are about to cross a crowded street, and you take a hasty glance in both directions to 
make sure of a safe passage. Now your eye is caught, for a moment, by the contents of a 
shop window; and you pause, though only for a moment, to survey the window before 
you actually cross the street….The preliminary glance up and down, which ordinarily 
connects with the crossing in a single attentive experience, is disjointed from the 
crossing; the look at the window, casual as it was, has been able to disrupt the associative 
tendencies. As you cross, then, you think ―Why, I crossed this street just now‖; your 
nervous system has severed two phases of a single experience, both of which are familiar, 
and the latter of which appears accordingly as a repetition of the earlier. (pp. 187–188) 
In this example, the feeling of familiarity stems from seeing an object twice—once without 
consciously attending to it, and a second time while fully attending to it.  Brown (2004) suggests 
this could also be considered a type of split in perceptual experience, caused by external or 
internal distractions.  This distraction then gives the impression that the object was encountered at 
two separate events.  This is called the Divided Perception Theory.  It is possible that several 
factors give rise to déjà vu experiences, or perhaps distinct experiences are collectively grouped 
as déjà vu.  However, the Divided Perception theory can be examined using a methodology that 
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uses a change detection task to simulate
1
 the perceptual split described by Titchener and Brown, 
followed by a recognition test to measure the effects on judgments of familiarity.  While Divided 
Perception may or may not be a viable theory of déjà vu, a first step towards evaluating this 
possibility is to determine what effect Divided Perception has on familiarity.  If Divided 
Perception can lead to déjà vu, one would expect to see parallel effects on familiarity, such that 
objects viewed under conditions of divided perception can later evoke feelings of familiarity. 
As discussed below, the change blindness phenomenon is a possible means of simulating 
conditions of divided perception.  There has been some prior work involving recognition in 
change blindness that is relevant to the issue of familiarity and Divided Perception, but there are 
several gaps in the literature.  The next section reviews the theory and background of change 
blindness effects, and points out several areas in which more work is needed. 
Change Blindness 
 People often feel that they are accurate perceivers of their surroundings, but research has 
shown that under certain conditions, people perform quite poorly at noticing large-scale changes 
in a scene.  For example, early research explored the phenomenon that one‘s own eye movements 
are not easily detected in a mirror, and that the visual world appears stable despite eye 
movements (Bridgeman, Hendry, & Stark, 1975).  In this study, participants were instructed to 
look at a series of fixation points and then make an eye movement from one fixation point to 
another.  During that time a certain stimulus shifted positions.  Results showed that participants 
were mostly unable to detect the change if it occurred 10ms or less after a saccade.  This was an 
early example of a type of change blindness.   
 Examining the conditions under which observers can detect or fail to detect changes in 
the environment reveals aspects of human perceptual mechanisms as well as the nature of 
                                                     
1
The term ―simulate‖ in this context refers to creating conditions similar to divided perception, and does not 
involve any type of computer simulation or mathematical modeling. 
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representations of the visual world.  Rensink (2002) describes change detection as the ability to 
report that a change has taken place, as well as identifying what has changed and where the 
change took place.  Change blindness is said to occur when participants cannot successfully 
perform one or more of these tasks.  There are a number of ways to achieve this effect.  One 
method is to make use of a gap or interstimulus interval between a pre-change and post-change 
stimulus.  For example, Rensink, O‘Regan, and Clark (1997) developed a flicker paradigm in 
which two pictures rapidly alternate on a computer screen.  The two pictures are identical except 
for one minor difference, such as an absent object, a moved object, or a color change.  When a 
brief gray screen (a visual mask) appears between the two pictures, identification of the change 
becomes difficult.   
Another method is to take advantage of an observer‘s own saccades, such as in the 
Bridgeman et al. (1975) experiment described above.  Also, one experiment involved a 
photograph of two people whose heads were exchanged during a saccade, which observers often 
missed (Grimes, 1996).  One can also simulate a saccade by making a change to an array at the 
same time as the array shifts position (Blackmore, Brelstaff, Nelson, & Troscianko, 1995); 
accuracy is considerably less compared to when the change occurs with no shift in position.  
Similarly, change detection is difficult when the change coincides with an observer‘s eyeblink 
(O‘Regan, Deubel, Clark, & Rensink, 2000).  One can also induce change blindness by making a 
change at the same time as superimposing ―‘patches‖ or ―splats‖ (something like mud splashes on 
a windshield) on the scene in such a way that they do not occlude the change (Rensink, O‘Regan, 
& Clark, 2000).  Change blindness can occur even if the change is gradual, such as an object 
gradually fading in or out of a scene (Simons, Franconeri, & Reimer, 2000).  Finally, change 
blindness can occur in real-life scenarios as well, such as when the change is occluded.  Well-
known examples come from Simons and Levin (1998), in which an experimenter asks a 
pedestrian for directions.  As the pedestrian provides directions, confederates walk between the 
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two people while carrying a door and the experimenter switches places with a different person 
hiding behind the door.  Fewer than half of the pedestrians reported noticing that a change had 
taken place.  Similar types of change blindness effects have been well-known to film editors as 
well, who can disguise discrepancies between scenes by cutting from one camera perspective to 
another (Simons & Levin, 1997). 
 One other aspect of change blindness research involves how many times a change 
appears.  ―Flicker‖ paradigms, such as that used by Rensink et al., (1997) involve a change 
occurring repeatedly.  Change detection is typically measured in terms of how many alternations 
occur or how much time passes until the participant detects the change.  There are also ―one-shot‖ 
paradigms, in which a change occurs only once, and change detection is measured in terms of 
whether the participant can correctly identify the presence of a change (Levin & Simons, 1997; 
Simons & Levin, 1998).  Response time can also be measured. 
 Change blindness effects occur across a range of scenarios.  They can occur when using 
simple arrays of symbols (Bridgeman et al., 1975), using 3-D computer-generated images of 
scenes (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002), photographs (Rensink et al., 1997), films of real-life 
interactions (Levin & Simons, 1997), and actual real-life interactions (Simons & Levin, 1998).  A 
key consideration is also whether the change detection task is intentional or incidental (Simons, 
2000).  For example, in laboratory-based tasks participants may be informed that changes will 
take place and that their task will be to detect those changes (e.g., Rensink et al., 1997).  In real-
life tasks, participants may not know that they are in an experiment at all (e.g., Simons & Levin, 
1998), and thus would not be on the lookout for changes.  This is an important distinction to point 
out, as it may explain differing findings in different experimental methodologies.  For example, 
Levin, Simons, Angelone, and Chabris (2002) presented participants with a real-life change 
blindness task and found that when participants failed to detect the change, they only performed 
at chance levels on a subsequent recognition test of the changing items.  Angelone, Levin, and 
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Simons (2003) performed a very similar procedure in the laboratory and found that participants 
performed at above chance levels on the same recognition test.  Levin et al., suggest that this may 
be because participants encode fewer features of the stimuli in real-life tasks, but anticipating a 
change allows participants to attend more closely to the stimuli, even though they did not detect 
the change. 
Theories of Change Blindness 
As for why change blindness effects occur, Rensink et al. (1997) argue that this effect is 
due largely to lack of attention for the changing object.  Rensink (2002) points out that the word 
―attention‖ has several meanings, and specifies that change detection likely involves ―focused 
attention‖ which Treisman and Gormican (1988) describe as a sort of spotlight that is directed 
upon an object to determine its location.  In other words, attention is needed to explicitly perceive 
a stimulus, and without this attention Rensink et al. argue that participants do not retain the 
representation of a scene that is needed to automatically detect a change.  They claim the original 
representation is simply overwritten or replaced.  Evidence in favor of this theory is that the 
changes are easier to detect when participants receive verbal cues as to where changes will 
occur—i.e., when participants know where to direct attention.  Supporting evidence comes from 
the finding that when the changing objects are more centrally located and ―interesting,‖ observers 
are faster in detecting the change than when objects are more marginal (Simons, 2000).  Simons 
and Rensink (2005a) also point out that although observers can attend to 4-5 objects at a time, 
they can only detect changes in one object at a time.  In conditions where the change coincides 
with splats, Rensink et al., (2000) argue that change blindness results from distracting attention 
away from the areas that change.  Rensink (2002) states that in general, changes in the real world 
are accompanied by motion, but when observers‘ attention is distracted away from motion, or 
motion does not accompany changes, changes can be difficult to detect.   
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However, Simons and Rensink (2005a) discuss that while attention is necessary to detect 
a change, it may not be sufficient.  They report examples of when observers attend to a change 
but fail to become aware of it, especially when they were not expecting any change (which relates 
to the difference between real-life and lab-based procedures discussed above).  For this reason, 
change detection has been used as a method to track attention in much the same way as eye 
tracking (Tse, Sheinberg, & Logothetis, 2003), and Simons and Rensink suggest that this method 
can be used to determine what aspects of a stimulus (such as shape or color) are receiving 
attention.  
 Another explanation for why change blindness occurs is that representations of scenes are 
never formed in the first place (Noë, Pessoa, & Thompson, 2000).  Similar effects, such as the 
perceptual sense of stability in the world despite saccadic eye movement, suggest that elaborate 
representations of the world are not created. A similar theory is that representations of pre-change 
scenes are formed, but they are quickly overwritten or replaced by post-change scenes (Beck & 
Levin, 2003).  Simons and Rensink (2005b) acknowledge that these views are intuitive and 
popular, but claim that these theories cannot describe many findings.  They espouse a different 
theoretical explanation in which participants do create representations of each scene, and these 
representations are retained, but change blindness results when participants fail to compare the 
two representations.  In work using real-life incidental change detection tasks, an experimenter 
asked for directions from a pedestrian while holding a basketball.  A group of confederates passed 
by and took the basketball without the pedestrian noticing.  Most of the pedestrians in the study 
did not report seeing the basketball disappear, but when asked about it they recalled that the 
experimenter had been holding one and could even describe its colors (Simons, Chabris, Schnur, 
& Levin, 2002).  In a more recent set of experiments, Mitroff, Simons, and Levin (2004) 
presented participants with simple arrays of objects in which one object changed.  Participants 
would try to detect the change then perform two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tests for pre- 
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and post-change objects.  Results showed that even when participants could not detect the change 
they could still recognize pre- and post-change objects at above chance levels, showing that some 
representation of the objects remains.  Similar evidence comes from Angelone et al., (2003), in 
which participants viewed motion pictures of people interacting with several changes across 
scenes.  Participants were later assessed for awareness of the changes, and then received 4AFC 
recognition tests to select the pre-change object.  The results showed that even when participants 
reported not being able to detect the change in the scene, they could still select the correct object 
at above-chance levels. 
 One study (Rosielle & Scaggs, 2008) examined change blindness for pre-experimentally 
familiar scenes.  Participants viewed photographs of their own campuses with certain buildings 
removed, and participants were asked to indicate whether something was absent.  Surprisingly, 
participants failed to detect the absent building over 80% of the time.  The authors propose that 
this is due to a lack of precision in visual long-term memory, but these findings could also be 
interpreted as failing to compare long-term representations with the current photographs.  
Recognition and Change Blindness 
 As discussed in the previous section, there is some previous work on recognition for 
critical items in a change blindness task, and it deals with how pre-change and post-change items 
are represented in memory.  One theory is that change blindness occurs because participants do 
not form a representation of the changed item, and therefore do not notice when it disappears.  A 
competing theory is that participants do form representations of both the pre-change and post-
change item, but that change blindness arises from a failure to compare these two representations.  
In support for the latter theory, Angelone et al., (2003) showed participants a motion picture of 
two people interacting with several objects changing across scenes.  Participants received a 
questionnaire to determine if they noticed the change, and to select the pre-change picture from a 
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list of four alternatives.  The results showed that even when participants reported not being aware 
of a change in the scene, they could still select the correct picture at above-chance levels. 
 In contrast, Levin et al., (2002) did not find above-chance performance on recognition 
tests for critical items in a real-life change blindness tasks.  One possibility that Levin et al. 
suggested is that in real-life tasks, participants may encode fewer features of the objects than in a 
lab-based task, when participants may be expecting a change and closely attending to stimuli. 
 Recognition memory has also been tested in change detection tasks when the change 
occurs gradually.  One study (Laloyaux, Devue, Doyen, David, & Cleeremans, 2008) presented 
participants with pictures of faces that gradually morphed the facial expression or remained 
unchanged, and participants were later asked to pick the face they had seen on a forced-choice 
recognition test.  When participants saw unchanging pictures, recognition memory performance 
for the pre-change face was fairly accurate.  When participants saw the gradually changed 
pictures (and did not detect the change), recognition memory performance was much less 
accurate, with participants being more likely to choose one of the lures, and also being less 
confident in their choices.  These results are counterintuitive, in that they appear to show poor 
recognition performance for undetected items.  However, unlike discrete changes, the gradual 
changes expose observers to a range of displays, and the authors emphasize that lower accuracy 
actually reflects retained representations for undetected changes, and claim that this is evidence of 
how undetected changes can influence recognition memory decisions. 
 These studies show that participants can recognize changed items even when the change 
was not detected, but they do not address many aspects of the relationship between change 
blindness and recognition memory.  For example, one shortcoming of these studies is the way in 
which change detection was assessed.  They tended to assess change detection by presenting 
participants with a questionnaire or survey about whether they noticed any changes or anything 
unusual, and these questions occurred after the experiment had ended.  This could pose a 
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problem, because participants may have noticed something unusual during the procedure but then 
forgotten it by the end of the experiment.  As Rensink (2002) explains, different degrees of 
change detection can be simply detecting that a change took place, identifying what item 
changed, or localizing the area of the change.  The aforementioned studies only measured 
whether observers could detect that a change occurred, while a more stringent criteria would have 
been to measure whether participants could localize the area of the change (likely revealing more 
instances of change detection than previously suspected; Fernandez-Duque &Thornton, 2000). 
This bears some similarity to issues of measure awareness of learning in implicit learning 
paradigms.  As Shanks and St. John (1994) point out regarding implicit learning tests, assessing 
awareness by self-report after a procedure is over could allow for the possibility that participants 
are aware of a manipulation while it is occurring but then fail to remember it or fail to report it on 
the final survey.  Likewise, in this change blindness task, a post-procedure questionnaire may not 
be the best way to measure change detection, and change localization may be more accurate. 
 Another issue is that in the previous studies involving recognition and change blindness, 
all items on the recognition tests are viewed from different perspectives than on the change 
detection task.  This type of study-test dissimilarity could underestimate performance on the final 
recognition test, although manipulating similarity between cue and target can increase or decrease 
recognition performance, and even have no effect at all (Nairne, 2002).  Comparisons of items in 
their original context vs. different contexts would be necessary to determine whether such 
differences affect recognition performance for undetected items in this task.  
Using Change Blindness to Assess Divided Perception Theory 
 To date, no research has directly tested Divided Perception Theory with regard to déjà vu 
experiences or feelings of familiarity.  Perhaps one reason for this lack of research is the 
difficulty in creating a task that simulates the experience of viewing a stimulus without always 
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attending to it, and allows the experimenter to keep track of when participants were focusing 
attention on the stimulus. 
 There are several established laboratory procedures that examine how much processing is 
devoted to unattended stimuli.  One of the most well-known is the dichotic listening task (Cherry, 
1953).  In this type of task, participants listen to two streams of auditory information (usually a 
spoken passage) presented to two separate headphones.  Participants are typically asked to 
―shadow,‖ or repeat the information from one headphone while disregarding the information from 
the other headphone.  Early results showed that very little information presented to the unattended 
ear reached consciousness, as participants did not report noticing if the unattended message 
switched languages.  One experiment even presented the same word list repeatedly to the 
unattended ear, which participants did not recognize on a subsequent recognition test (Moray, 
1959).  There is also a visual analog of dichotic listening, in which participants view two 
superimposed videos and are instructed to attend to only one (Neisser & Becklen, 1975).  Similar 
to results from dichotic listening procedures, participants are unable to report very much about 
the unattended video. 
 Although dichotic listening and ―selective looking‖ tasks are effective at measuring the 
effects of unattended stimuli across many trials, one issue that makes them inappropriate for 
examining Divided Perception is that an experimenter would be unable to keep track of when 
participants surreptitiously shift attention between channels.  A typical safeguard would be to 
eliminate all trials of a dichotic listening tasks when participants fail to correctly shadow the 
instructed channel, but Jacoby (1991) claims that participants may still be able to switch channels 
and process the to-be-ignored channel.  Posner and Snyder (1975) also claim that participants can 
still mostly attend to one channel while still switching to the other, so an experimenter could 
never be completely sure that unattended channels are truly unattended. 
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 Although change detection tasks are also not perfect measures of the focus of attention, 
they allow for more measurement on a trial-by-trial basis of where participants were attending.  It 
is important to point out that change blindness is not the same construct as divided perception, but 
they bear enough similarity to allow for change blindness to be used as a simulation of divided 
perception.  For example, a key component of the perceptual split described by Titchener (1928) 
is two viewings of a scene—the first under diminished attention and the second under full 
attention.  A flicker task is able to re-create the experience of this ―double-take,‖ and change 
detection status can track whether participants had attended to a specific, critical object.  In 
addition, visual stimuli may be more appropriate for this type of investigation, as Brown (2003) 
reports that déjà vu experiences are more often triggered in response to visual input.  In sum, 
change blindness may not be identical to divided perception, but it presents a useful means of 
simulating the experience because change blindness and divided perception both result from 
disruptions to attention and change detection can be used to track the focus of attention.  This, in 
addition to the existing research already on recognition for undetected items, makes a change 
detection task an effective tool for investigating divided perception. 
Overview of Current Experiments 
The current experiments built off of change blindness research to examine recognition 
memory performance for items in a change detection task.  Unlike the Angelone et al. (2003) and 
Levin et al. (2002) studies, the current experiment used a task that allowed participants to 
immediately localize changes in scenes and obviate problems with post-experiment 
questionnaires.  On a subsequent recognition test, participants were presented with objects from 
the earlier part of the experiment, and participants provided familiarity ratings or other types of 
recognition responses.  These responses were compared against responses for objects that did not 
appear earlier in the experiment. 
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The change detection paradigm is different from standard flicker tasks, such as those used 
by Rensink et al., (1997).  Instead of two pictures alternating back and forth repeatedly, the 
current flicker task involves one alteration; the first picture is complete and the second picture is 
lacking the critical object—what Rensink (2002) calls a ―one-shot paradigm.‖  This procedure 
controls for the amount of time that critical objects appear on the screen, which could impact 
familiarity ratings.  Participants are instructed to click on the area where something disappeared, 
serving as a more sensitive measure of change detection than questionnaire methods used in 
previous research.  
The following experiments also make use of a modification of the RWI paradigm.  In 
typical RWI experiments, participants receive a study list of unaltered stimuli and then a test list 
of perceptually degraded stimuli.  The degraded stimuli can be word fragments, written words 
embedded in visual noise, spoken word fragments, spoken words embedded in visual noise, 
fragments of pictures, pictures embedded in visual noise, and so on.  Participants are charged with 
identifying the degraded stimuli and then rating how familiar they seem.  Familiarity ratings are 
then compared between studied and unstudied items when participants could not identify them at 
test.  The current experiment utilized a procedure similar to the reverse RWI manipulation in 
Cleary and Greene (2000), in which stimulus identification is hindered at study rather than test.  
Using change blindness as the method of hindering identification, familiarity ratings are 
compared between studied and unstudied items that participants did not detect changing during 
study. 
The first hypothesis of the following set of experiments is that observers are able to 
demonstrate recognition for undetected items, in accordance with Divided Perception Theory.  
Although previous research has reported findings of recognition for undetected items (e.g., 
Angelone et al., 2003), the methods of assessing change detection may have lacked sensitivity, 
and likely missed instances of change detection.  The current studies use a more sensitive 
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measure of change detection that has not yet been used in conjunction with recognition tests.  In 
addition, the current studies employ a different type of recognition test that involves a continuous 
rating scale of familiarity, as opposed to solely using forced-choice responses, and the flicker task 
is specifically designed to resemble divided perception.  Support for this hypothesis would 
demonstrate support for the Divided Perception theory of déjà vu,   The second hypothesis 
(investigated in Experiments 1, 2, and 3) is that manipulations to stimulus characteristics, such as 
location and color, can influence recognition decisions.  Prior work (e.g., Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, 
& Oliva, 2008) has shown that observers can be extremely sensitive to minor variations in the 
details or position of items in a scene.  In contrast, other work has shown that observers can be 
fairly insensitive to subtle changes (such as mirror reversals) in the details of an object 
(DiGirolamo & Hintzman, 1997).  These experiments will examine the degree to which 
participants are sensitive to these characteristics in change detection, and perhaps shed light on 
what types of manipulations might contribute to feelings of déjà vu.  The third hypothesis 
(investigated in Experiments 4 and 5) regards the degree to which recognition for undetected 
items is determined by recollection vs. familiarity processes.  Prior work has only examined 
whether participants could recognize undetected objects, but not how those objects are 
recognized.  It is predicted that undetected items can be recognized on the basis of familiarity 
alone,  Jacoby (1991) claims that no task relies on only one process, but these experiments can 
examine the relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to recognition of undetected 
items.  Previous research (Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2002) suggests that manipulations of 
attention will affect recollection processes but not familiarity, and the current experiments will 
examine whether the same pattern occurs in change blindness. 
 The purpose of the first experiment was to examine recognition in a change detection task 
with localization of the change as the measure of change detection.  The hypotheses are that 
participants will demonstrate higher levels of recognition for undetected items than for unstudied 
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items (using a more sensitive measure of change detection than previous research), and that 
manipulations to the locations of critical items will affect performance on the recognition test 
(which also uses a different procedure than previous research).  At test, critical items either 
appeared in their studied locations or a standardized location to examine the influence of study-
test match on recognition.  It is expected that presenting critical items in their studied locations 
will lead to higher ratings. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants.  One hundred forty-two Colorado State University undergraduates 
participated in exchange for credit in a psychology course.  
 Materials.  The stimuli were 50 photographs of everyday scenes.  All scenes contained 
only inanimate objects.  All stimuli were original creations by the experimenter, and there were 
four versions of each photograph: Unaltered, Object Absent, Studied Position and Centered 
Position.  Figure 1 provides an example of each version of a stimulus.  As defined in greater 
detail below, the Unaltered and Object Absent versions appeared at study, and the Studied 






The Unaltered version comprised scenes from everyday life (such as bedrooms, 
bathrooms, offices, outdoors, etc.).  Each scene contained several objects which were appropriate 
for the scene. 
The Object Absent version was identical to the Unaltered version, with the exception that one 
object was removed from the scene.  The object removed from each scene will henceforth be 
referred to as the ―critical object.‖  Each critical object was removed from a scene by taking a 
second photograph from the same perspective of the first photograph (by use of a tripod) after 
physically removing one object. The Studied Position version of the photograph contained only 
the critical object, presented in isolation.  This was achieved with Adobe Photoshop by selecting 
the critical object from the Unaltered version and deleting everything else, leaving a white 
background.  The critical object remained in the same position it occupied in the Unaltered 
Figure 1.  Example of the stimuli that appeared in Experiment 1. 
27 
 
version. The Centered Position version of the photograph also contained only the critical object in 
isolation, but the critical object appeared in the center of the scene rather than in its studied 
position. 
Procedure.  The entire experiment ran on a computer with E-Prime software.   The 
experiment was divided into two parts: the study list, during which participants first viewed the 
Unaltered and Object Absent scenes while performing a change detection task, and the test list, 
during which participants rated the familiarity of critical items in the Studied Position or Centered 
Position conditions. 
The following instructions appeared at the beginning of the study list:  ―In this 
experiment, you will see pictures of scenes.  First you will see the complete scene, then the same 
scene with something missing.  Your job will be to figure out what was missing.‖ 
Participants received 25 such trials on the study list.  Each trial consisted of two versions 
of a photograph—the Unaltered version and the Object Absent version.  First, a gray screen 
appeared for 5 seconds with the phrase ―Complete scene…‖  Next, the Unaltered version 
appeared for 2 seconds.  Then another gray screen appeared for 5 seconds with the phrase 
―Something missing…‖ Then, the Object Absent version appeared on the screen with a prompt at 
the top of the screen reading, ―Click on where something is missing.‖  At this point, the mouse 
cursor appeared on the screen.  Participants had unlimited time to make the choice, and the 
experiment continued only after the participant clicked on some part of the screen.  Clicking on 
the screen constituted the ―change detection‖ task in the current set of experiments.  Figure 2 
represents the timeline of a study trial, in which the Unaltered scene is followed by a gray mask 






After participants made the click, the mouse cursor disappeared again and another gray screen 
appeared with the phrase ―Next scene…‖ for 2 seconds.  Participants did not receive feedback as 
to whether they were correct.  Participants received an example with a prominent change before 
the first trial began.  The 25 photographs were randomly selected from the entire set of 50.  The 
25 photographs appeared in random order. 
After the last study trial, the following instructions appeared:   
Very good.  Now, in the next part of the experiment, you will answer questions about 
objects that were missing from the scenes. 
Each object will appear by itself.  Some of them appeared in scenes you saw earlier.  You 
may even have identified them when they were missing.  But some of the objects did not 
appear in scenes you saw earlier--they were not presented at all. 
Figure 2.  Example of a study trial in Experiment 1. 
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All you have to do is rate how familiar you find each object.  Do not worry if you 
remember seeing it before or if you identified it as missing.  Just rate whether you 
experience any feelings of familiarity. 
Then participants began the test trials.  There were 50 test trials, in which the critical 
objects from all 50 photographs appeared in random order.  The version that participants received 
at test (Studied Position or Centered Position) was a between-subjects manipulation and 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions.  There were 71 participants in each 
condition. 
Each test trial consisted of a critical object appearing on the screen.  At the bottom of the 
screen was a rating scale ranging from 1 to 9.  On the far left, 1 had the label ―Very Unfamiliar.‖  




Participants had unlimited time to make the rating, and the experiment continued only after the 
participant made a rating.  After the rating, a white screen appeared with the phrase ―Next 
object…‖ for 1 second.  After all 50 test trials, a screen appeared to tell the participant that the 
experiment was over. 
Figure 3.  Example of a test trial in Experiment 1. 
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Data Scoring.  For each change detection response, the program recorded the coordinates 
of the mouseclick.   These coordinates were then compared to a range of coordinates for the 
critical item.  This range of coordinates formed an area in the shape of a rectangle.  No critical 
item was exactly in the shape of a rectangle, so the area of the rectangle was slightly larger than 
the critical item itself so that the item could be completely covered.  If participants clicked 
anywhere in the area that a critical item had occupied, that trial was labeled ―Change Detected.‖  
Because the area of the rectangle was slightly larger than the critical item itself, responses were 
classified as correct somewhat liberally.  If participants clicked outside that area, the trial was 
labeled ―Change Undetected.‖ 
Results and Discussion 
 All t-tests reported are paired-samples t-tests unless otherwise stated.  Starting with the 
change-detection data, participants in both conditions together correctly detected the location of 
the change 54% of the time (SD=14%).  Every participant had at least some correct responses 
(with the lowest performance being at 20%) but no participant was correct on every trial (with the 
highest performance being at 84%).  Participants in the Studied Position condition correctly 
identified the location of the change 54% of the time (SD=14%) and participants in the Centered 
Position correctly identified the location of the change 53% of the time (SD=15%).  These 
conditions had identical study procedures which explains why performance at study is so similar.  
When participants were incorrect in their responses, they were a mean of 3.78cm (SD=1.18) away 
from the nearest edge of the critical item.  Participants‘ responses were significantly faster when 
correct (M=2.3 s, SD=0.96) than when incorrect (M=3.94 s, SD=1.71), t(141)=15.43, SE=0.11, 
p<.001.  Looking at the stimuli themselves in an items analysis, there is no correlation between 
the area of the critical item and the likelihood that it will be identified (r=.00, p=.99), nor was 
there a correlation between the area of the critical item and the speed with which participants 
made correct responses (r=-.08, p=.56 ) or incorrect responses (r=.04, p=.77 ) 
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The primary data of interest are the familiarity ratings given to items on the test trials.  
Particularly, critical items at test either appeared on the study list or did not (Studied vs. 
Unstudied), and of the critical items that did appear at study, participants either detected the 
change or did not (Detected vs. Undetected).  This creates three different conditions at test: 
Studied/Detected, Studied/Undetected, and Unstudied.  (Unstudied items were items that did not 
appear on the study list, so they never had the opportunity to be detected.)  Familiarity ratings are 
compared for each of these conditions.  Another aspect of the data is comparison between 
familiarity ratings for the different test conditions (Studied Position vs. Centered Position).  The 
term ―test conditions‖ is reserved for this between-subjects manipulation. 
 Considering both test conditions together, a One-way Repeated-Measures ANOVA 
compared familiarity ratings for Unstudied items against Studied/Detected items and 
Studied/Undetected items.  Results indicated a significant difference between means, 
F(2,282)=443.42, MSE=0.66, p<.001, partial η
2
=0.76.  Pairwise comparisons using paired-
samples t-tests revealed that Studied/Detected items received higher familiarity ratings than 
Studied/Undetected items, t(141)=13.06, SE=.10, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.02, and 
Studied/Undetected items in turn received higher familiarity ratings than Unstudied items 
t(142)=18.37, SE=.08, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.16.
2
  The comparison between familiarity ratings for 
Studied/Undetected items and Unstudied items suggests that even when participants fail to detect 
the critical item in a scene, that items still produces higher familiarity compared to items that 
never appeared.   The mean ratings appear in Figure 4.  The pattern shows that although ratings 
are highest for Detected items, Undetected items still received higher ratings than Unstudied 
items.  In other words, the pattern suggests that participants are able to recognize items despite 
not detecting them earlier.  This supports prior work on change detection, but by using a different 
procedure and different methods of recognition memory assessment the current experiment is 
                                                     
2
 These effects were replicated in an items analysis. 
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able to demonstrate that recognition can occur for undetected items using a localization measure, 
which previous research has shown can reveal more instances of change detection (Fernandez-
Duque & Thornton, 2000; Rensink, 2002).  Therefore, these results rule out the possibility that 
recognition may have only been occurring for weakly-detected items, which previous research 
could not do.  This procedure also used a one-shot variation of the flicker task to simulate divided 







Figure 4.  Combined familiarity ratings from both test conditions in Experiment 1.  
Error bars represent standard error. 
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 One additional dependent measure that can be analyzed is the time in which participants 
provided the ratings.  Previous research has shown that the speed with which participants make 
recognition decisions can be indicative of recognition processes, with faster responses 
corresponding to familiarity-based judgments and slower responses corresponding to 
recollection-based judgments (Yonelinas, 2002). If detection at study leads to recollection at test, 
one may expect to see slower reaction times in ratings for Detected items, and faster reaction 
times in ratings for Undetected items.  A One-way Repeated-Measures ANOVA revealed a 
significant difference, F(2,282)=4.93, MSE=106.,90, p<.01, partial η
2
=0.03, with participants 
providing ratings significantly faster for Studied/Detected items compared to Studied/Undetected 
items, t(141)=2.12, SE=0.04, p<.05, but there is no significant difference in reaction time between 
Studied/Undetected and Unstudied items, t(141)=0.91, SE=0.03, p=.37.  Figure 5 shows the mean 
reaction times for each condition, with ratings for Detected items being slightly faster than 
Undetected and Unstudied items.  In several ways, the pattern depicted in Figure 5 is the opposite 









  One potential explanation of this counterintuitive result would be a non-normal distribution, in 
which one of the conditions (most likely Undetected) contained trials in which participants 
responded quickly and slowly.  An analysis of the distribution of mean reaction times can indicate 
whether this is a possibility.  Figure 6 presents a frequency distribution of mean reaction times of 
ratings for Detected, Undetected, and Unsudied items to examine whether differences in the 
variance of rating speed for each type of item could explain the unexpected pattern in Figure 5. 
Figure 5.  Mean reaction times during the rating task from both test conditions in 







The distributions for Detected, Undetected, and Unstudied reaction times may all have a slight 
positive skew.  The Undetected distribution appears somewhat bimodal, which suggests the 
variance may be different from other distributions.  Indeed, Mauchly‘s Test of Sphericity 
indicated a significant difference (p=.04), indicating that variances may not be equal across all 
levels.  A t-test on the mean of the standard deviations from each condition show that there was 
significantly higher variability in the Unstudied condition than Undetected, t(142)=2.19, SE=0.04, 
p<.05.   If individual trials of faster than 0.2 s or slower than 6 s are removed, the tails are 
somewhat altered but the overall shape of the distributions remains the same, but the difference in 
standard deviations between Undetected and Unstudied ceases to be significant (p=.10) while the 
difference between Detected and Unstudied becomes significant, t(142)=2.71, SE=0.03, p<.01.   
In sum, the statistical differences in mean reaction time across study/detection status may be an 




artifact attributable to the variance.  It is also important to point out that participants were not 
instructed to provide their ratings within a certain response deadline (typically less than one 
second), which is often the basis by which familiarity processes are isolated (Yonelinas, 2002).  
Without this response deadline, one cannot be sure that potential differences in reaction time do 
indeed reflect the use of different recognition processes.  Therefore, reaction time data will not be 
included in future experiments. 
 Turning back to the familiarity ratings, next is a comparison between ratings for Studied 
Position test trials to Centered Position test trials.  A 2 (Test Condition:  Studied Position vs. 
Centered Position) X 3 (Study/Change-Detect Status:  Studied/Change-Detected vs. 
Studied/Change-Undetected vs. Unstudied) Mixed Factors ANOVA was computed on the 
familiarity ratings, with Test Condition as a between-subjects variable and Study/Change-Detect 
Status as a within-subjects variable.  This revealed the same main effect of Study/Change-
Detection as when the conditions were combined, F(2,280)=443.29, MSE=0.66, p<.001, partial 
η
2
=0.76.  There was also a main effect of Test Condition F(1,140)=8.75, MSE=3.50, p<.01, 
partial η
2
=0.06, in which the Studied Position items tend to receive significantly higher 
familiarity ratings than items in Centered Position.  Independent-samples t-tests show 
significantly higher familiarity ratings for Studied Position items when Unstudied, t(140)=2.84, 
SE=0.20, p<.01, Studied/Undetected, t(140)=2.84, SE=0.23, p<.01, and marginally significant for 
Studied/Detected t(140)=1.87, SE=0.21, p=.06.  There was no significant interaction between 
Test Condition and Study/Change-Detect Status, F(2,280)<1, MSE=0.66, p=.38.  Figure 7 depicts 
the mean ratings, separated by Test Condition (Studied Position vs. Centered Position).  The 
overall pattern of ratings for Detected vs. Undetected vs. Unstudied is the same as in Figure 4, but 








 Finally, it is worth noting that the main results of interest (the difference in familiarity 
ratings corresponding to Studied/Detected, Studied/Undetected, and Unstudied) result from trials 
when participants do and do not correctly detect the location of the change.  However, to 
correctly detect the location of the change the participants were required to click inside an area 
slightly larger than the space formerly occupied by the critical item.  This response area was 
slightly liberal but could still be too strict of a criterion, as participants may have clicked in the 
general area of the critical item but not exactly where it had been or the slightly larger response 
Figure 7.  Familiarity ratings in Experiment 1, separated by test condition.  Error 
bars represent standard error. 
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area.  In the event this happened, the subsequent familiarity rating for the item might be higher 
than one would expect for an Undetected item, and thus drive the difference in ratings between 
Undetected and Unstudied.  One way to examine this possibility is to enlarge the area which 
constitutes a correct detection, and see whether the same pattern of familiarity ratings still 
appears.  In a follow-up analysis, the acceptable area for each critical item was expanded, so that 
mouseclicks in a wider area around the critical item would also constitute correct detections.  The 
expanded acceptable area was four times the original area of the critical item (twice the width and 
twice the height).  In this more liberal coding, participants were correct in their responses 68% of 
the time (SD=14%) instead of 54%.  When participants were incorrect in their responses, they 
were a mean of 5.18cm (SD=1.45) away from the nearest edge of the critical item.  However, the 
same pattern of familiarity ratings appeared; Change/Undetected items received significantly 
lower familiarity ratings than Change/Detected, t(141)=13.54, SE=.12, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.13  
and significantly higher ratings than Unstudied, t(141)=12.34, SE=.09, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 0.81.  
Even if the acceptable area is expanded to the entire quadrant of the screen in which the critical 
item appears, the same pattern appears.  The rate of correct responses increases to 72% 
(SD=11%) but Change/Undetected items still received significantly lower familiarity ratings than 
Change/Detected, t(141)=10.45, SE=.13, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 0.91  and significantly higher 
ratings than Unstudied, t(141)=12.38, SE=.10, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 0.85. 
 The results of Experiment 1 have demonstrated a novel procedure which examines 
recognition memory performance for items in a change detection task.  The hypothesis that 
participants will demonstrate recognition of undetected objects was supported; the results indicate 
that correctly detecting the critical item in a change-detection task increases familiarity ratings on 
a recognition test, but even when participants do not detect the critical item, familiarity ratings are 
higher than those for unstudied items.  In other words, familiarity ratings are higher for studied 
items even when participants did not detect their earlier absences.  This provides initial support 
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for the Divided Perception theory, and presents a means of investigating déjà vu experiences 
stemming from this type of manipulation.  The subsequent experiments in this paper will explore 
this effect more fully. 
Experiment 2 
 The results from Experiment 1 suggest that the positioning of the critical item on the 
recognition test also seems to play a role; when the item was in its studied location, familiarity 
ratings were somewhat higher than when the critical item appeared in the center of the screen. 
This suggests that previously-published studies‘ measures of recognition for changed items might 
have been underestimates, as their recognition tests presented the changed items in different 
contexts (e.g., Angelone et al., 2003).  However, one caveat of this interpretation is that in the 
Centered Position condition of this experiment (and the Angelone et al. experiments), all test 
items were presented in a standardized location.  The decreased familiarity ratings could have 
been due to more uniformity among all test trials (which would also explain the significant 
decrease in familiarity ratings for unstudied items, which should not have been affected).  The 
purpose of Experiment 2 is to determine whether the decrease in familiarity for the Centered 
Position condition is due to increased uniformity between trials, or if any alteration of the studied 
position of the critical items will lead to a decrease in familiarity ratings.  If ratings are lower for 
items that appear in non-studied positions, it would suggest that location changes contribute to 
decreased familiarity.  This manipulation is also in line with the way that the RWI paradigm has 
been used to examine the features that contribute to familiarity.  In this experiment, the features 
being examined are the relative positions of the items and their orientation (either studied 
orientation or a mirror image). 
Method 
 Participants.  Eighty-four Colorado State University undergraduates participated in 
exchange for credit in a psychology course. 
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 Materials.  The stimuli were the same 50 photographs of everyday scenes used in 
Experiment 1.  The Unaltered version and Object Absent version were the same as in the study 
list of Experiment 1, but the manipulations performed at test were different. 
 Instead of a Studied Position and Centered Position version for the critical items, the test 
list presented a Mirror Image version or a Shifted Position version.  The Mirror Image version 
was the mirror image of the Studied Position version, such that the critical object appeared 
reversed and in the opposite half of the horizontal axis.  The Shifted Position version of the 
photograph was the critical object in isolation, but moved to a different part of the screen.  It is 
different from the Mirror Image version in that the critical item was not reversed. 
Procedure.  The procedure was identical to Experiment 1.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to the Mirror Image or Shifted Position conditions, whereby participants received only 
one type of manipulation at test.  Forty-two participants were in each condition.  Performance in 
these conditions will ultimately be compared against performance in the Studied Position and 
Centered Position from Experiment 1, and although assignment to experiments was not truly 
random, these two experiments ran in overlapping weeks. 
Results and Discussion 
 Again starting with the change-detection data, participants in both conditions together 
correctly detected the location of the change 52% of the time (SD=13%).  Participants in the 
Mirror Image condition correctly identified the location of the change 51% of the time (SD=10%) 
and participants in the Shifted Position correctly identified the location of the change 53% of the 
time (SD=16%).  When participants were incorrect in their responses, they were a mean of 
4.03cm (SD=1.22) away from the nearest edge of the critical item. 
 Considering familiarity ratings from both test conditions together, a One-way Repeated-
Measures ANOVA compared familiarity ratings for Unstudied items against Studied/Detected 
items and Studied/Undetected items.  Results indicated a significant difference between means, 
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F(2,166)=245.33, MSE=0.64, p<.001, partial η
2
=0.75.  Pairwise comparisons using paired-
samples t-tests revealed that Studied/Detected items received higher familiarity ratings than 
Studied/Undetected items, t(83)=9.38, SE=.12, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.06, and Studied/Undetected 
items in turn received higher familiarity ratings than Unstudied items, t(83)=12.71, SE=.12, 
p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.35.  This replicates the main findings from Experiment 1 that familiarity 
ratings for Studied/Undetected items are significantly higher than those for Unstudied items, 
showing that participants can experience familiarity for items that were never detected.  
 Comparing familiarity ratings from both test conditions separately, a 2 (Test Condition:  
Mirror Image vs. Shifted Position) X 3 (Study/Change-Detect Status:  Studied/Change-Detected 
vs. Studied/Change-Undetected vs. Unstudied) Mixed Factors ANOVA was computed, with Test 
Condition as a between-subjects variable and Study/Change-Detect Status as a within-subjects 
variable.  This revealed the same main effect of Study/Change-Detection as when the conditions 
were combined, F(2,164)=245.89, MSE=0.64, p<.001, partial η
2
=0.75.  However, unlike in 
Experiment 1, there was no main effect of Test Condition, F(1,82)<1, MSE=2.62, p=.94, which 
indicates that the two different test manipulations did not impact familiarity ratings in distinct 
ways.  Figure 8 presents the mean ratings by Detection/Study status, separated by Test Condition.  










If the acceptable response is expanded by doubling the width and height of the original 
response area, the rate of correct detection is increased to 66% (SD=13%).  When participants 
were incorrect in their responses, they were a mean of 5.43cm (SD=1.40) away from the nearest 
edge of the critical item.  Under the more liberal coding scheme, one participant detected every 
change, eliminating data for Undetected trials and reducing the degrees of freedom for the 
following tests. Under this more liberal coding scheme of correct and incorrect detection, 
Figure 8.  Familiarity ratings in Experiment 2, separated by test condition.  
Error bars represent standard error. 
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Studied/Detected items received significantly higher ratings than Studied/Undetected items, 
t(82)=9.30, SE=0.14, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.11, and Studied/Undetected items received 
significantly higher ratings than Unstudied items, t(82)=9.15, SE=0.14, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.03. 
 However, the ultimate purpose of Experiment 2 is to determine whether any alteration of 
the critical item‘s studied position will decrease familiarity, or if uniformity between test trials 
produced the decrease in familiarity for the Centered Position condition of Experiment 1.  To 
determine this, one must compare from the Mirror Image and Shifted Position conditions of 
Experiment 2 to the Studied Position and Centered Position conditions of Experiment 1.  
Although participants were not truly randomly assigned to conditions, the experiments ran in 
overlapping weeks and had identical procedures.  Data from the first 42 participants in each 
condition were analyzed using a 4 (Test Condition:  Studied Position vs. Centered Position vs. 
Mirror Image vs. Shifted Position) X 3 (Study/Change-Detect Status:  Studied/Change-Detected 
vs. Studied/Change-Undetected vs. Unstudied) Mixed Factors ANOVA, with Test Condition as a 
between-subjects variable and Study/Change-Detect Status as a within-subjects variable.  It 
revealed no main effect of condition, F(3,164)=1.45, MSE=3.19, p=.23,  or an interaction 
between test condition and study/change detection status, F(3,164)=0.77, MSE=0.71, p=.52.  
Looking at the graph of all four conditions together (Figure 9), one can see that the general trend 
is that shifting the position of the critical items decreased familiarity, but not to the degree that 








Figure 9.  Familiarity ratings from the first 42 participants of Experiments 1 
and 2, separated by test condition.  Error bars represent standard error. 
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 Experiment 2 replicates the main findings of Experiment 1; familiarity ratings were 
higher for Studied/Detected items than Studied/Undetected items, which were in turn higher than 
Unstudied items.  However, unlike Experiment 1, Experiment 2 did not find any differences 
between test conditions, and the hypothesis that location changes could be responsible for 
decreased ratings was not supported.  One possibility is that familiarity ratings are not sensitive to 
the studied locations of the critical items, as previously suspected, but instead decreased due to 
increased uniformity between trials.  The lower familiarity ratings from Experiment 1 were 
obtained from items that were all presented in the same location (which also potentially explains 
the decrease in familiarity ratings for Unstudied items, which should be insensitive to studied vs. 
different locations).  Experiment 3 attempts to answer this question by increasing uniformity 
between trials in a different way—by presenting critical items in their studied colors or in a 
standardized grayscale. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 1, critical items appeared in one of two test conditions; they either 
appeared in their studied relative position in the scene or in a central, standardized location.  
Results indicated that presenting critical items in the central location tended to decrease ratings, 
and it was suggested that this could be due to increased uniformity to the trials.  Experiment 3 
examined whether increased uniformity could also be established by presenting all test items in 
standardized colors.  Just as in Experiment 1, when critical objects appeared at test in either their 
studied positions or a standardized location, in Experiment 3 the critical objects appeared at test 
in their studied colors or standardized colors (grayscale).  In much the same way that Experiment 
2 examined the impact of location on ratings, Experiment 3 also examines the contribution of 
color information as a potential features used in recognition decisions.  Because the previous 
experiment did not demonstrate any significant effect of manipulating the locations of the critical 
items at test, an alternative possibility is that increased uniformity caused the decrease in ratings 
46 
 
for Center Position items in Experiment 1.  Therefore, the hypothesis of the current experiment is 
that ratings will be lower for critical items presented in grayscale. 
Method 
 Participants.  Sixty Colorado State University undergraduates participated in exchange 
for credit in a psychology course.   
Materials.  The stimuli were identical to that of Experiment 1, with the following 
exceptions:  All critical objects at test appeared in their studied locations.  One group of 
participants received the critical objects in their studied colors, and another group of participants 
received the critical objects in grayscale.  These test conditions were labeled the ―Color 
condition‖ and the ―Grayscale condition,‖ respectively. 
Procedure.  The procedure was identical to Experiment 1.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to the Color or Grayscale conditions, whereby participants received only one type of 
manipulation at test.  Thirty participants were in each condition. 
Results and Discussion 
 Participants in both conditions correctly detected the location of the change at study 55% 
of the time (SD=17%).  Participants in the Color condition detected the location of the change 
55% of the time (SD=16%) and participants in the Grayscale condition detected the location of 
the change 55% of the time (SD=19%).  When participants were incorrect in their responses, they 
were a mean of 4.05cm (SD=1.25) away from the nearest edge of the critical item. 
Considering familiarity ratings from both test conditions together, a One-way Repeated-
Measures ANOVA compared familiarity ratings for Unstudied items against Studied/Detected 
items and Studied/Undetected items.  Results indicated a significant difference between means, 
F(2,118)=119.84, MSE=0.95, p<.001, partial η
2
=0.67.  Pairwise comparisons using paired-
samples t-tests again showed that Studied/Detected items received higher familiarity ratings than 
Studied/Undetected items, t(59)=7.29, SE=.18, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 0.90, and Studied/Undetected 
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items in turn received higher familiarity ratings than Unstudied items, t(59)=7.84, SE=.18, 
p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.11.  This replicates the main findings from Experiments 1 and 2 that 
familiarity ratings for Studied/Undetected items are significantly higher than those for Unstudied 
items, showing that participants can experience familiarity for items that were never detected.  
 Next is the comparison of familiarity ratings for Color test trials to Grayscale test trials.  
A 2 (Test Condition:  Color vs. Grayscale) X 3 (Study/Change-Detect Status:  Studied/Change-
Detected vs. Studied/Change-Undetected vs. Unstudied) Mixed Factors ANOVA was performed 
on the familiarity ratings, with Test Condition as a between-subjects variable and Study/Change-
Detect Status as a within-subjects variable.  This revealed the same main effect of Study/Change-
Detection as when the conditions were combined, F(2,116)=119.65, MSE=0.95, p<.001, partial 
η
2
=0.67.  However, like in Experiment 2 (and unlike in Experiment 1), there was no main effect 
of Test Condition, F(1,58)<1, MSE=3.78, p=.66, which indicates that the two different test 
manipulations did not impact familiarity ratings in distinct ways.  Figure 10 presents the mean 
ratings across Detection/Study status, separated by Test Condition.  Once again, as in Experiment 







If the acceptable response is expanded by doubling the width and height of the original 
response area, the rate of correct detection is increased to 70% (SD=17%).  When participants 
were incorrect in their responses, they were a mean of 5.58cm (SD=1.36) away from the nearest 
edge of the critical item.  Under this more liberal coding scheme of correct and incorrect 
detection, Studied/Detected items received significantly higher ratings than Studied/Undetected 
items, t(59)=10.41, SE=0.16, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.18, and Studied/Undetected items received 
significantly higher ratings than Unstudied items, t(59)=5.31, SE=0.19, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 0.74. 
Figure 10.  Familiarity ratings in Experiment 3, separated by test 
condition.  Error bars represent standard error. 
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The purpose of Experiment 3 was to examine the influence of standardized color 
information on familiarity ratings.  The overall pattern of ratings for Studied/Detected vs. 
Studied/Undetected vs. Unstudied replicated from Experiments 1 and 2.  However, like in 
Experiment 2 (but unlike in Experiment 1) the comparisons between test conditions revealed no 
significant differences, and the uniformity hypothesis was not supported.  This suggests that the 
role of color information has limited importance in this recognition memory task, and that 
increasing similarity between trials had limited effect, although see the General Discussion for a 
more thorough interpretation of these findings. 
Experiments 2 and 3 have mostly served the purpose of replicating the effects obtained in 
Experiment 1 and examining the stimulus characteristics that contribute to those effects.  Overall, 
the general conclusions are that stimulus characteristics do not play a large role in recognition 
memory performance for critical items.  Even when a stimulus characteristic does exert a 
significant influence (such as location, in Experiment 1), the effect size is very small.  Therefore, 
the remaining experiments will focus more on the role of response options at study (such as the 
availability of a Don‘t Know response) and test (by providing different assessments of 
recognition memory performance). 
Experiment 4 
As discussed earlier, the purpose of the change detection task is to simulate the 
experience of divided perception and examine its effects on familiarity.  However, as of yet the 
experiments have not explicitly investigated the role of recollection in the recognition decisions.  
Experiment 4 had two purposes: The first was to add a new response option to assess the role of 
guessing on change detection, and the second was to examine the basis of the familiarity ratings 
at test.  Regarding the first purpose, one aspect of Experiment 1‘s procedure is that changes occur 
on every study trial and participants make a response on every trial.  The recorded responses 
cannot discriminate between trials when participants are merely guessing and trials when 
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participants are incorrect.  This is an important distinction to make because a pure guess on the 
change detection task could reflect a diminished ability to encode aspects of the critical item.  If 
this is the case, it would suggest that there is a limit to the recognition that can stem from divided 
perception, and that some minimal degree of attention is required during encoding.  One potential 
solution to this issue is to provide a ―Don‘t Know‖ option when detecting the change.  On prior 
occasions when participants would otherwise have made blind guesses, the Don‘t Know option 
can be used instead to indicate insufficient encoding to even guess.  As several other researchers 
have suggested (Rensink et al., 1997; Wolfe, Reinecke, & Brawn, 2006), some degree of attention 
is required to detect changes, and a Don‘t Know response would indicate extremely low levels of 
attention—potentially even lower than when detection attempts were simply incorrect.  
Therefore, it is predicted that ratings for items labeled Don‘t Know will be lower than ratings for 
Undetected items. 
The second purpose of Experiment 4 was to examine how participants made familiarity 
ratings for critical items.  One possibility is that participants were simply experiencing familiarity 
for the critical item.  Another possibility is that seeing the critical item at test could cue 
participants to recollect it as the changing item from study, even if the change was not correctly 
localized.  If this is the case, it would suggest that participants are able to encode characteristics 
of the item without detecting the change.  This issue can be addressed by including an additional 
recognition test.  In the event that participants could not detect the location of the change, but 
might still recognize the critical item as such if encountered again, a 2-alternative forced-choice 
(2AFC) test of was included after the rating procedure.  In this 2AFC test, participants were asked 
to pick the critical item from a scene with the alternative being an item that appeared in the scene 
but did not disappear.  This can determine whether participants can be cued to recognize the 
critical item even without detecting the change.  The hypothesis is that the ratings for Undetected 
items are based on a feeling of familiarity in the absence of cued recollection, which would 
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predict that 2AFC performance will not be significantly different from chance for Undetected 
items. 
Method 
 Participants.  Thirty-nine Colorado State University undergraduates participated in 
exchange for credit in a psychology course. 
Materials.  Materials were the same Unaltered and Object Absent scenes and studied 
color/studied location critical items from Experiment 1 and 2.  In addition, 50 items that appeared 
in scenes but did not disappear were isolated to serve as alternatives in the rating task and 2AFC 
test.  These items that did not disappear in the Object Absent scene were labeled ―non-critical 
items.‖  Non-critical items that appeared in scenes at study are referred to as Studied Non-critical 
items, and non-critical items that did not appear in scenes at study are referred to as Unstudied 
Non-critical items.   
Procedure.  The study/change detection procedure was identical to that of Experiments 1 
and 2, with the exception that when participants attempted to detect the location of the change on 
each Object Absent scene, a red rectangle appeared at the bottom of the screen with the words 
―Don‘t Know‖ in black letters.  Participants were told that they were free to guess, but if they 
truly did not know where an item disappeared, they were instructed to click on the ―Don‘t Know‖ 
rectangle.  This constituted a ―Don‘t Know response,‖ as referred to in the results section. 
During the rating procedure, all participants received the same condition.  (There were no 
between-groups comparisons.)  The 50 non-critical items also appeared on the rating task, so that 
participants rated 100 items unlike the 50 on previous experiments.  Twenty-five of these items 
were critical items from studied scenes (of which some were correctly detected and others were 
not).  Another 25 items were critical items from non-studied scenes.  Twenty-five items were 
non-critical items from studied scenes, and the final 25 items were non-critical items from non-
studied scenes.  (The reason for the inclusion of the non-critical items on the rating task is 
52 
 
explained below.)  Items were randomly assigned to study status and all items appeared in 
random order.  
After the rating procedure ended, participants received 50 trials of a 2AFC test.  On this 
test, a critical item appeared on one half of the screen and a non-critical item appeared on the 
other half (left vs. right).  Whether the critical item appeared on the left or right was 
counterbalanced across participants, and the order of the trials was random.  Participants were 
instructed to pick which item disappeared earlier, during the study procedure.  If participants 
believed the item on the left was the critical item, they were instructed to push the A key.  If 
participants believed the item on the right was the critical item, they were instructed to push the L 
key.  An A or L label appeared beneath each item.  In half the trials, neither the critical item nor 
the non-critical item appeared during the study procedure, which was used as a control to detect 
whether participants could pick the critical item at above-change levels even when neither item 
appeared at study (which would indicate some fundamental difference between critical and non-
critical items).  Participants had an unlimited amount of time to decide, and there was a one-
second interval between trials.  This task was included to test the possibility that participants are 
being cued to recollect the critical item from study, even without being able to detect the location 
of the change.  The reason that the non-critical items also appeared on the rating task earlier in the 
experiment was to control for recent exposure.  If the non-critical items had not appeared on the 
rating task and only the critical items had, participants may have been able to correctly the pick 
the critical item simply because they recognized it as familiar from the rating task.   
Results and Discussion 
Participants correctly detected the location of the change 53% of the time (SD=16%).  
Participants were incorrect 36% of the time (SD=17%) and used the Don‘t Know response 11% 
of the time (SD=11%).  Eleven participants did not use the Don‘t Know response at all.  When 
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participants were incorrect in their responses, they were a mean of approximately 3.63cm 
(SD=1.09) away from the nearest edge of the critical item.   
Analyses on the familiarity ratings in this experiment are slightly different from previous 
experiments, as the rating task included non-critical items (which were items that did not 
disappear from scenes) which were either studied or unstudied.  It is important first to see 
whether there is any difference in familiarity ratings between critical and non-critical items, 
regardless of detection status.  Results show that there is not; ratings for Studied/Critical items 
were not significantly different Studied/Non-critical items, t(38)=0.79, SE=0.17, p=.43.  At first 
glance, this is a strange finding, as Non-critical items received more exposure than Critical items, 
and familiarity ratings might be expected to be higher for items with more exposure time.  
However, factoring in Detection status shows that Detected Critical items received significantly 
higher familiarity ratings than Studied/Non-critical items, and Undetected/Critical items received 
significantly lower familiarity ratings than Studied/Non-critical items.  The ratings for Detected 
and Undetected items which were combined for an overall ―Studied Critical‖ group were simply 
averaging out to create a null difference.  There was also no significant difference between 
Unstudied Critical and Unstudied Non-critical items, t(38)=0.71, SE=0.11, p=.48.  This latter 
result is reassuring in that it shows that familiarity is roughly comparable between critical and 
non-critical items, which is an important consideration for the analysis of the 2AFC test (reported 
later).  The subsequent analyses of familiarity ratings by detection status will focus only on 
critical items (as non-critical items were not a component of the detection task). 
A One-way Repeated-Measures ANOVA was conducted on the familiarity ratings for 
critical items that were Studied/Detected, Studied/Undetected, Studied/‖Don‘t Know‖, and 
Unstudied.  (The Unstudied ratings were only for critical items so that they would represent 
familiarity for the same items across participants.)  This revealed a significant difference between 
conditions, F(3,81)=42.41, MSE=1.19, p<.001, partial η
2
=0.61.  Using paired-samples t-tests as 
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pairwise comparisons reveals that ratings for Studied/Detected items were significantly higher 
than Studied/Undetected, t(38)=5.05, SE=0.24, p<.001, Cohen‘s d=0.88, which replicates the 
same pattern from previous experiments.  Ratings for Studied/Undetected items were also 
significantly higher than Don‘t Know items, t(27)=4.09, SE=0.35, p<.001, Cohen‘s d=0.80, and 
Unstudied items, t(38)=9.00, SE=0.17, p<.001, Cohen‘s d=1.11, which was predicted.  However, 
ratings for Don‘t Know items were not significantly different from Unstudied items, t(27)=0.48, 
SE=0.31, p=.63.  Figure 11 presents the mean ratings for each type of test item.  The pattern of 
Detected, Undetected, and Unstudied is very much the same as in previous experiments, with the 
novel finding that Don‘t Know items receive comparable ratings as Unstudied items. 
 
 Figure 11.  Familiarity ratings for critical items from Experiment 4, separated 





If the area of acceptable response is expanded by doubling the width and height of the 
original response area, the rate of correct detection is increased to 65% (SD=15%) and the 
incorrect detection rate decreases to 24% (SD=14%).  The incorrect responses were a mean of 
approximately 5.33 cm away from the nearest edge of the expanded response area (SD=1.91).  
The rate of Don‘t Know responses was not affected because the Don‘t Know response area was 
separate from the rest of the scene.  Under this more liberal coding scheme of correct and 
incorrect detection, Studied/Detected items received significantly higher ratings than 
Studied/Undetected items, t(38)=4.90, SE=0.29, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 0.92, and 
Studied/Undetected items received significantly higher ratings than Don‘t Know items, 
t(27)=2.87, SE=0.37, p<.01, Cohen‘s d=0.54, and unstudied items, t(38)=4.83, SE=0.24, p<.001, 
Cohen‘s d= 0.69.  Again, the classification of Don‘t Know and Unstudied is not affected by the 
area of acceptable response, so that comparison is the same as under the original coding scheme. 
Moving on to the results of the 2AFC, the proportions of correct responses are presented 
in Table 1.  The proportions of correct responses seem to present a pattern of results similar to 
that measured by ratings; participants were reliably better at picking the critical item when it was 
studied than when it was unstudied, t(38)=6.89, SE=.03, p<.001, and a one-sample t-test shows 
that participants were no better than chance at picking the correct item when it was unstudied, 
t(38)=1.76, p=.09.  Among studied items, participants were better at picking the critical item 
when it was Detected than when it was Undetected at study, t(38)=3.55, SE=.03, p<.001, but 
there was no significant difference in performance between items that were Undetected and Don‘t 
Know, t(27)=0.70, SE=.08, p=.49, or between items that were Don‘t Know and Unstudied, 
t(27)=1.17, SE=.06, p=.25.  Performance for Undetected items was better than Unstudied items, 
t(38)=3.38, SE=.03, p<.01.  Interestingly, performance for Undetected items was significantly 
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better than chance, t(38)=4.71, p<.001, but performance for Don‘t Know trials was not, 
t(27)=1.76, p=.09 (although this effect is marginal).  The same pattern of results appears when 
using the more liberal classification of Detected and Undetected. 
Table 1 
Proportion correct on 2AFC test from Experiment 4. 
             
 
Studied 
Unstudied Studied (All) 
      Detected Undetected Don‘t Know 
 
  M  SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
 
   .53 .11 .71 .11   
Original Area     .77 .12 .65 .20 .61 .33 
4X Area     .74 .13 .66 .22 .61 .33 
 
 
             
Note.  The Studied and Unstudied proportions are out of all 25 items, and the proportions of 
Change Detected, Change Undetected, and Don‘t Know responses are out of the total number of 
each type of response during study. 
 
One possibility these results suggest is that participants are basing their 2AFC decisions 
for Undetected items on relative familiarity.  When an item is Detected, participants are able to 
make the correct choice because they recollect the critical item from when it was detected at 
study.  When an item is Undetected, participants may have experienced more familiarity for the 
non-critical item (due to greater exposure time) and then used that familiarity to infer that the 
other choice was the critical item, allowing participants to correctly pick the critical item at 
above-chance levels even when the it was undetected.  However, results from the familiarity 
rating task (which occurred before the 2AFC task) show that there was no significant difference 
between familiarity ratings for Undetected Critical items and Non-critical items in scenes whose 
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Critical items were undetected, t(38)=0.65, SE=0.32, p=.52.  This suggests that the above-chance 
performance for Undetected items on the 2AFC is not likely due to relative familiarity. 
The results of the 2AFC test replicate the results of Angelone et al., (2003), in that 
participants are reliably better than chance at picking the changing item even when the change 
was not detected at study.  In the context of this experiment, the purpose of the 2AFC test was to 
determine whether participants might actually be cued to recollecting the critical items during the 
familiarity rating task, even when the items could not be detected at study.  These results seem to 
suggest that is a possibility, and go against the hypothesis that ratings for Undetected items are 
made on the basis of familiarity.  However, in an additional analysis of trials when participants 
did not pick the critical item in the 2AFC test, familiarity ratings are still significantly higher for 
undetected items (M=3.69, SD=2.02) than unstudied items (M=2.87, SD=1.44), t(36)=2.93, 
SE=.28, p<.01.  Therefore, this provides support that the ratings can be based on only feelings of 
familiarity without recollection processes because ratings were still higher for critical items than 
unstudied items, even when the critical items were neither detected at study nor recollected 
during the 2AFC task.  
The main conclusions from this experiment were that trials when participants were 
unable to guess the location of the change produced comparable recognition performance (in 
familiarity ratings and 2AFC responses) as when participants never saw the item at all, as 
predicted by the hypothesis for Don‘t Know responses.  This suggests that in a state of divided 
perception, observers must experience a certain minimum level of attention if they are to later 
recognize the item.  In other words, there may be a limit to how ―divided‖ perception can be in 
order to later experience familiarity for undetected items.  This experiment also incorporated the 
use of a 2AFC test to measure recognition of critical items to examine whether participants may 
have been cued to recollect the critical item even when they did not detect the change.  The 
results showed that even when participants did not correctly detect the location of the critical item 
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at study, they could still pick the correct item in a 2AFC, which suggests that the higher 
familiarity ratings for undetected items may have been driven by cued recognition for the critical 
item during the rating task.  However, a subsequent analysis showed that even when participants 
could not pick the correct item on the 2AFC, and the item was undetected at study, familiarity 
ratings were still higher than for unstudied items.  This supports the hypothesis that ratings can be 
made only on feelings of familiarity, and also supports the Divided Perception theory in general, 
because analyses showed that even if participants can recognize an item that was not detected on 
the basis of a cue, they do not always do so, and controlling for this, participants can still 
experience familiarity for undetected and uncued critical items.  
Experiment 5 
 The results of Experiment 4 suggest that participants may be able to sometimes recollect 
the occurrence of the critical item at study even when they could not correctly detect the location 
of its change.  Although this does not completely rule out the role of familiarity (the final analysis 
actually supported the role of familiarity), it opens the question of how much contribution 
recollection and familiarity each make for recognition of undetected items.  In other words, it is 
not clear how change detection corresponds to recollection vs. familiarity.  Experiment 5 
investigated this by using a well-studied method of estimating the contributions of recollection 
and familiarity in recognition judgments--the Remember-Know procedure.  The current 
procedure included a Remember-Know judgment for each critical item at test to measure which 
items participants recognized on the basis of recollection and which items participants recognized 
on the basis of familiarity, with Remember responses corresponding to recollection and Know 
responses corresponding to familiarity.  This was aimed at determining whether change detection 
contributes to later recollection, with the hypothesis being that detection will promote recollection 
processes while having less effect on familiarity processes.  The prediction is that participants 
provide more Remember judgments for detected items compared to undetected items, and more 
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Know judgments for undetected items compared to new items (which would suggest familiarity-
based discrimination).  Unstudied items will likely receive a large proportion of ―New‖ 
judgments. 
Method 
 Participants.  Twenty-nine Colorado State University undergraduates participated in 
exchange for credit in a psychology course. 
Materials.  The stimuli were identical to that of Experiment 1, with all stimuli appearing 
in their studied colors, and all critical objects appearing in their studied locations at test. 
Procedure.  The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the exception that 
instead of rating the familiarity of each critical item at test, participants provided an Old/New 
judgment for each item.  The terms ―Old‖ and ―New‖ correspond to Studied and Unstudied, 
respectively, such that an Old item appeared in a scene on the study list and a New item did not 
appear in a scene on the study list.  If participants indicated the item was New (by pressing ―N‖), 
the next item appeared on the screen.  If participants indicated the item was Old (by pressing 
―O‖), they were prompted to indicate how they made the recognition judgment.  They were told 
that if they could specifically remember seeing the object on the study list, they should press ―R‖ 
for Remember.  If they could not specifically remember seeing the object but they knew on some 
other basis that the item appeared earlier, they should press ―K‖ for Know.  The instructions and 
general procedure were based off of those used by Rajaram (1993). 
Results and Discussion 
 Participants correctly detected the location of the change 52% of the time (SD=14%).  
When participants were incorrect in their responses, they were a mean of 4.02cm (SD=1.25) away 
from the nearest edge of the critical item.  When the acceptable response area is increased by 
doubling the width and height of the original area, the correct detection rate increases to 67% 
(SD=15%), with incorrect responses being a mean of 5.61cm (SD=1.37) away from the nearest 
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edge of the critical item.   Due to the controversy surrounding the calculation and analysis of 
Remember-Know data (see Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara & Knight, 1998), the proportions 
of Remember, Know, and New responses were calculated two different ways.  The first way 
followed Rajaram‘s (1993) method of raw proportions, in which the number of items correctly 
detected at study was used to calculate the proportion of Studied Remember, Know, or New 
responses when Detected or Undetected.  This was done by dividing the number of Remember, 
Know, or New responses at test by the number of times each participant detected or failed to 
detect the change at study.  The False Alarm rate was also calculated by dividing the number of 
items called Old (either Remember or Know) by the number of Unstudied items (which was 
always 25).  The second way addressed the Independence Remember-Know (IRK) assumption 
proposed by Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995) by calculating conditional probabilities.  In this 
method, the proportion of Studied Remember responses were calculated the same way as before 
(as the number of Remember responses divided by the number of Detected or Undetected items), 
but the proportion of Know responses was calculated by the dividing the number of Know 
responses by the number of Detected or Undetected items, all divided by one minus the 
proportion of Studied Remember responses.  This is to account for the smaller number of trials to 
which participants can respond Know.  To calculate False Alarms, the proportion of Remember 
responses was calculated by dividing the raw number of Remember responses by the number of 
Unstudied items (again, always 25), and the proportion of Know responses was calculated by 
dividing the number of Know responses by 25 over one minus the proportion of Remember 
responses.  Table 2 presents the mean proportions of Old and New responses, as well as the 
proportions of Remember and Know responses for Old items.  Both raw proportions and 
conditional probabilities are presented for Know responses.  False Alarms, appearing on the far 
right, represent Old and Remember/Know responses for unstudied items.  The proportions are 
presented for items labeled Detected under the original area and the expanded area, although 
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there appear to only be minor differences.  The pattern of Old responses again mirrors the pattern 
of results measured by the 2AFC task as well as ratings, with interesting new insights into the 
self-described uses of recollection and familiarity processes. 
Table 2 
Mean proportion of hits and false alarms by response type when items were Detected or 
Undetected at study in Experiment 5. 
             
 
    Detected Undetected   False Alarms 
 
    M SD M SD   M SD 
 
Original Area 
Overall Recognition  .65 .17 .48 .17   .24 .15 
 Remember  .51 .19 .26 .15   .08 .09 
 Know (Raw)  .14 .13 .22 .12   .16 .13 
 Know (Conditional) .30 .20 .30 .16   .18 .14 
 
4X Area 
Overall Recognition  .64 .17 .43 .20   .24 .15 
 Remember  .48 .19 .21 .18   .08 .09 
 Know (Raw)  .16 .13 .22 .16   .16 .13 
 Know (Conditional) .31 .19 .28 .22   .18 .14 
 
             
 
 Starting with the analysis of the raw proportions, A One-way Repeated-Measures 
ANOVA on proportion of Old responses for Detected, Undetected, and Unstudied items indicated 
a significant difference, F(2,90)=107.07, MSE=.02, p<.001, partial η
2
=0.70, with Detected items 
being called Old more frequently than Undetected items, t(45)=6.67, SE=.03, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 
1.06, and Undetected items were called Old more frequently than Unstudied items, t(45)=8.51, 
SE=.03, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.50.  This replicates the recognition performance from previous 
experiments.  The same pattern of results occurs when using the data from the expanded 
acceptable response area. 
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 When the recognition data are separated into Remember and Know responses, Detected 
items received significantly more Remember responses than Undetected items, t(45)=9.11, 
SE=.03, p<.001, Cohen‘s d= 1.46, while Detected items received significantly fewer Know 
responses than Undetected items, t(45)=3.2, SE=.02, p<.01, Cohen‘s d= 0.64.  In a 2 (Response 
Type: Remember vs. Know) x 2 (Detection Status: Detected vs. Undetected) Repeated-Measures 
ANOVA, this manifests itself in a significant interaction, F(1,45)=56.36, MSE=.02, p<.001, 
partial η
2
=0.56, in which Remember Responses are more likely for Detected items, but Know 
responses are more likely for Undetected items.  Know responses were also significantly higher 
for Undetected items than Unstudied items, t(45)=2.26, SE=.02, p<.05, Cohen‘s d= 0.48, which 
suggests a role of familiarity-based discrimination in Undetected items.  Remember responses 
were also more likely for Undetected items than Unstudied items, t(45)=8.76, SE=.02, p<.001, 
Cohen‘s d= 1.50, which suggests that participants may be able to recollect an item despite failing 
to detect it (see below for a discussion).  The same pattern of results occurs when using the data 
from the expanded acceptable response area, with the exception that the difference in Know 
responses between Detected and Undetected items is only marginally significant (p=.07), as is the 
difference between Undetected and Unstudied items (p=.06). 
 Moving on to the conditional probabilities, there is no significant difference in the rate of 
Know responses between Detected and Undetected items, t(45)=0.22, SE=.04, p=.82, although 
there was a significant difference in Know responses between Undetected and Unstudied items 
t(45)=4.27, SE=.03, p<.001, Cohen‘s d=0.80.  Remember items were calculated the same was as 
in the raw proportions, so those comparisons are the same as before.  The 2 x 2 (Response Type: 
Remember vs. Know) x (Detection Status: Detected vs. Undetected) Repeated-Measures 
ANOVA, still shows a significant interaction, F(1,45)=29.57, MSE=.03, p<.001, partial η
2
=0.40, 
in which Remember responses are more likely for Detected items, but there is no significant 
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difference in Know responses between Detected and Undetected items.  The same pattern of 
results occurs when using the data from the expanded acceptable response area.  
 Finally, regarding reaction time data, a 2 x 2 (Response Type: Remember vs. Know) x 
(Detection Status: Detected vs. Undetected) Repeated-Measures ANOVA showed no difference 
in the speed with which participants made Remember or Know judgments, p‘s>.15. 
 The results of this experiment replicate the findings from previous experiments using a 
different measure of recognition memory performance.  Instead of providing familiarity ratings 
on a continuous scale, participants provided dichotomous Old/New judgments for each item and 
specified whether each Old judgment was made on the basis of recollection or familiarity.  
Participants provided more Old responses for Detected items than Undetected items, which 
received more Old responses than Undetected items.  This follows the pattern obtained using 
familiarity ratings.  Examining the pattern of Remember-Know responses suggests that 
successfully detecting the location of the change at study leads to a higher likelihood of reporting 
Recollection at test.  However, given the fact that participants gave more Remember responses to 
Undetected items than Unstudied items, it appears that failure to detect the location of the change 
at study does not preclude later recollection.  This seems to explain the results from Experiment 
4, which show that participants could still pick the critical item in the 2AFC test despite not 
detecting it at study.  This supports the hypothesis that detection does seem to promote 
recollection, as Remember responses were more likely for detected items, but recollection is still 
possible for undetected items (although less likely).  Proportions of Know responses were 
comparable for Detected and Undetected items, which shows that familiarity is less affected than 
recollection by varying levels of attention.  Similar findings occur in studies for divided attention 
(Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2002).  Finally, Know responses were more likely for Undetected 
items than Unstudied items.  Taken together, this suggests that participants are more likely to rely 
on familiarity in the recognition of Undetected items, as predicted.  The two methods of 
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calculating Know responses mostly agreed, with the raw proportions suggesting that Know 
responses are slightly more likely in the Undetected than Detected condition, which would 
suggest that recognition of Undetected items rely more on familiarity, but this analysis does not 
hold when using a more liberal classification of detection.  In addition, Yonelinas et al. (1998) 
showed that amnesics appeared to demonstrate enhanced familiarity (according to raw 
proportions of Know responses) when at best they should only show unimpaired familiarity 
compared to controls, which was one motivation to calculate conditional probabilities.  With this 
in mind, the conditional proportions probably reflect a more accurate measure of familiarity. 
 
General Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether conditions described by the Divided 
Perception theory of déjà vu (Brown, 2003, 2004) would allow participants to experience feelings 
of familiarity for unattended objects.  This set of experiments simulated conditions of divided 
perception by using a change detection task, and found a highly replicable effect in which 
undetected items evoked higher familiarity ratings than unstudied items.  As familiarity is a 
strong component of déjà vu experiences (e.g., Cleary, 2008), this research is a necessary first 
step towards showing that divided perception could lead to déjà vu experiences.  No prior 
research has examined the Divided Perception theory, and very few studies in cognitive 
psychology have investigated the cause of déjà vu experiences.  Therefore, the current study 
represents a potential new direction for this burgeoning field of research. 
Overview of Current Experiments  
All experiments presented above followed the same general procedure.  The stimuli 
were photographs of everyday scenes containing various objects, and as each scene alternated to 
an identical scene with one object absent (the critical item), participants were charged with 
detecting the area in the scene where something disappeared.  Later in the experiment, 
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participants took a recognition memory test for items that appeared earlier in the experiment 
(some of which were successfully detected, some not) and items that did not appear earlier in the 
experiment. 
Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5 had identical study procedures, and Experiment 4 was 
different only in providing an option for participants to indicate that they did not know where the 
change took place.  All experiments found that participants successfully detected the location of 
the change around 50-55% of the time, measured by whether participants could click in the space 
formerly occupied by the critical item.  If a more liberal response area is used, which is four times 
as large as the original response area, the rate of correct detection increases to around 65-70% 
accuracy, but this does not alter the results of the recognition tests. 
Experiment 1 presented the critical items at test either in their studied locations (where 
they originally appeared in the study scenes) or in the center of the screen.  Results showed that 
overall, participants gave the highest familiarity ratings to items that were detected.  Ratings for 
undetected items were lower, but still significantly higher than ratings for unstudied items.  This 
established the findings, obtained in all following experiments, that change detection at study 
enables superior performance on a subsequent recognition test, but participants are still able to 
recognize an item even without detecting it.  Regarding the location of the critical item at test, 
results showed that familiarity ratings were slightly lower for items presented in the center of the 
screen.  This suggested the possibility that moving the critical item from its studied location, or 
possibly increasing uniformity between all stimuli, would serve to make each stimulus less 
familiar.  These possibilities were examined in Experiments 2 and 3. 
Experiment 2 examined whether location shifts were responsible for the decrease in 
familiarity ratings in Experiment 1.  Critical items at test appeared in a shifted location 
(somewhere they didn‘t originally appear at study) or as mirror-reversed images of themselves.  
These two conditions did not produce significant differences in ratings from each other, nor from 
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the two conditions in Experiment 1 (although the overall pattern of ratings for Detected, 
Undetected, and Unstudied items was the same as Experiment 1).  This provided evidence against 
the possibility that location differences alone produced the ratings decrease in Experiment 1, and 
Experiment 3 went on to examine whether the possibility that increased uniformity between 
stimuli produced the effect. 
In Experiment 3, critical items at test either appeared in their studied colors or in a more 
standardized grayscale.  As in Experiment 2, the overall pattern of ratings for Detected, 
Undetected, and Unstudied was the same, but there were no significant differences in ratings 
when items appeared in Color or grayscale.  This provided evidence against the possibility that 
uniformity alone produced the ratings decrease in Experiment 1.  The most likely conclusion is 
that some combination of location differences and interstimulus similarity produced the ratings 
decrease for centrally-located critical items in Experiment 1, and that the effects were small 
enough to make isolating them difficult. 
Overall, Experiments 1-3 examined how stimulus characteristics potentially contribute 
to recognition of undetected items.  Results showed that the stimulus characteristics manipulated 
in these experiments had weak or inconsistent effects.  This is in contrast to previous work that 
shows participants can be extremely sensitive to minor changes in scenes.  Not only are 
participants capable of recognizing hundreds of images with 90% accuracy at delays of up to a 
week (Shepard, 1967), but participants can show equally high levels of performance in 
discriminating between a studied object and the same object in a different pose (Brady et al., 
2008).   
However, other findings show that participants may recognize objects despite minor 
changes to location, orientation, or color.  For example, Experiment 2 showed that familiarity 
ratings for mirror-reversed images of critical items were numerically lower but not significantly 
lower than unaltered items.  Hintzman, Curran, and Oppy (1992) discovered a similar effect, in 
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which participants provided frequency judgments for items that had appeared 0-15 times.  
Frequency judgments increased as actual frequency of presentation increased, but participants 
also provided greater-than-zero frequency judgments for mirror images of studied items, even 
though those mirror images never actually appeared earlier.  In other words, participants falsely 
recognized mirror images of studied images.  DiGirolamo and Hintzman (1997) even found that 
memory for an object can be strengthened by repeated presentations of that object‘s mirror image.  
The current results are in concordance with prior work suggesting that participants may treat 
mirror images of objects as more or less interchangeable.  Regarding the color manipulation of 
Experiment 3, prior work has shown that color information may enhance recognition of scenes, 
but only when the color information is ―diagnostic‖ (Nijboer, Kanai, de Haan, & van der Smagt, 
2008).  In this context, diagnostic color information may help people to recognize grass, which is 
always green, but not a cup, which could be any color.  Nijboer et al. actually found that for 
recognition of objects was superior when presented in grayscale, rather than full color, due to a 
higher false-alarm rate for artificial objects.  Overall, these findings may suggest that participants 
are attending primarily to meaning-based information.  Information in visual images can involve 
size, color, location, and others, but these attributes can be altered without changing the identity 
of the object (Kostic & Cleary, 2009).  Simons (2000) has even pointed out that attending to the 
meaning of a scene, rather than perceptual details, is one factor that could contribute to the 
phenomenon of change blindness. 
Experiment 4 began investigating different response options at study and test.  At study, 
participants had the option of responding ―Don‘t Know‖ during the change detection task.  In 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3, participants were required to respond on every trial, which did not allow 
for comparisons in ratings between trials in which participants thought they were correct and 
trials in which participants were guessing.  Experiment 4‘s Don‘t Know response option allowed 
for these comparisons, which addressed whether presentation of a stimulus under the extremely 
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low levels of attention would still allow the observer to later experience familiarity.  Experiment 
4 also included a second type of recognition test, after the rating task, as an investigation into 
whether the higher familiarity ratings for Undetected items compared to Unstudied items could be 
driven by participants cued to recollect the Critical item even when it was not detected.  In a 2-
Alternative Forced Choice (2AFC) test, the critical item from one of the scenes appeared next to a 
non-critical item (one that did not disappear) from that same scene and participants had to pick 
which of the items disappeared at study.  To date, most prior work on recognition in change 
detection has made use of 2- or 4-AFC, but no studies until this one have compared performance 
between different types of recognition task.  Results replicated the effects from previous 
experiments; participants provided the highest familiarity ratings for items that were detected at 
study, and lower familiarity ratings for items that were not detected, although these ratings were 
still significantly higher than ratings for unstudied items.  Interestingly, when participants 
responded Don‘t Know, the ratings were not significantly different from when the items were 
unstudied.  In other words, Don‘t Know trials may correspond to trials when participants were 
paying very little attention.  The results of the 2AFC test corresponded with familiarity ratings; 
highest accuracy was for items that participants had detected at study, and accuracy was lower for 
undetected items although performance was still significantly better than chance.  Accuracy for 
Don‘t Know and Unstudied items was not significantly better than chance.  This replicates 2AFC 
performance from previous studies (e.g., Angelone et al., 2003), but also suggests that the 
difference in ratings is due to recollection.  However, even when participants did not pick the 
correct item on the 2AFC, familiarity ratings for Undetected items were still significantly higher 
than Unstudied items, which shows that recollection is not always driving the difference in 
familiarity ratings.  Nevertheless, the results of the 2AFC test show that recollection processes 
may be involved on the rating task, and Experiment 5 investigated this. 
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Experiment 5 used a Remember-Know procedure to estimate the contributions of 
recollection and familiarity processes to performance on the recognition test.  After each critical 
item appeared on the recognition test, participants first responded O or N to indicate if the item 
was old (studied) or new (unstudied), respectively.  If participants responded N, the trial ended 
and the next critical item appeared on the screen.  If participants responded O, they were told to 
specify how they made the recognition judgment.  They were instructed that if they specifically 
remembered seeing the item earlier, they should push R for Remember (which corresponds to 
recollection).  If they did not specifically remember seeing the item, but they know it appeared, 
they should push K for Know (which corresponds to familiarity).  Although previous studies have 
examined manipulations of attention on recollection and know processes (Jacoby, 1991), none 
have examined these processes under conditions of change blindness.  Results showed that 
participants were more likely to press R for detected items than undetected items, which suggests 
that change detection seems to contribute to later recollection.  Furthermore, participants were 
more likely to press K for undetected items than unstudied items, which shows that even when 
participants to not recollecting seeing an item before, they are still able to discriminate old from 
new on the basis of familiarity.  However, detection does not always lead to recollection, as not 
every detected item received an R response.   Many undetected items received R responses as 
well (significantly more than unstudied items), which shows that participants may be recollecting 
items even without detecting them at study.  Nevertheless, this experiment does provide evidence 
that detection can contribute to later recollection of undetected items, although recollection is less 
likely to occur for undetected items while familiarity remains constant.  This relates well to 
Divided Perception theory, in that it shows that familiarity is more likely to be used as the basis 
for recognition decisions when attention was disrupted.  Similar findings come from tradition 
Divided Attention tasks, such as those reported by Jacoby (1991) and others (Yonelinas, 2002).  
In the first two experiments of Jacoby‘s study, participants made old-new judgments of words 
70 
 
while engaging in a listening task, which consisted of listening to a random sequence of numbers 
and indicating when three odd numbers were presented consecutively.  Results showed that 
divided attention was more likely to hinder recollection processes more than familiarity 
processes, and decisions based on familiarity were more or less constant across conditions of full 
or divided attention (similar to the results of the current paper‘s Experiment 5).  Jacoby also 
discusses the ―factor pure problem‖ of how no task relies on only one process.  This same issue is 
evident in the current findings that recognition decisions for detected items rely on more than just 
recollection, and decisions for undetected items rely on more than just familiarity. 
Implications for the Present Findings for Theories of Change Blindness 
The current results concur with previous work in showing that observers can recognize 
undetected items, and the current experiments extend prior work using different methods of 
assessing change detection and recognition performance.  Starting with the change detection task, 
much prior work on change detection (e.g., Angelone et al., 2003, Rensink et al., 1997) has 
assessed change detection by simply asking participants whether they noticed a change, and 
sometimes even asking this question after the stimuli are no longer visible.  This measure may not 
be sensitive enough to register all instances of change detection, and allow for the possibility that 
participants may have noticed a change but forgotten it by the time they were interviewed.  
Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2000) claim that verbal reports are a poor measure of change 
detection, and demonstrate that participants can indicate the location of a change even without 
being aware that a change took place.  For that reason, the current study measured change 
detection by having participants indicate the location of the change, not the identity of the change 
or simply whether a change took place.  This is in accordance with research that has shown that 
an important part of change detection is focusing attention on the area in which a change occurs 
(Rensink et al., 1997; Rensink, 20002).  Hollingworth and Henderson (2002) showed that change 
detection could occur even when participants were not focusing on the object during the change, 
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although participants needed to have focused attention on the object at some point in time (not 
necessarily during detection).  Wolf et al. (2006) found that participants failed to detect color 
changes in arrays of dots even when cued to the location of the change, if they were not focusing 
attention on the dot during the change.  Having this more accurate means of assessing change 
detection allows for a more accurate means of assessing recognition, as well.  In terms of 
assessing recognition, the current set of experiments also included the first instance of examining 
the role of recollection and familiarity processes in recognizing undetected objects.  Prior work 
has only examined whether participants could recognize undetected objects, but not how those 
objects are recognized. 
In addition, the inclusion of different response options in the study procedure (in 
Experiment 4, below) allows for analysis of the role of guessing.  The results of Experiment 4 
demonstrate a novel effect in change detection, in that when participants did not feel they could 
accurately detect the location of the change, later familiarity for that item is comparable to 
familiarity for items that never appeared.  In other words, although previous work has suggested 
that change detection can be an implicit process (Fernandez-Duque & Thornton, 2000), this work 
suggests that participants at least have enough explicit knowledge of the representation to indicate 
when they will not be able to recognize a change, which is in line with other work showing that 
change detection can be explained through explicit processes (Mitroff, Simons, & Franconeri, 
2002). 
Finally, a theoretical debate in the change detection literature revolves around whether 
change blindness occurs because representations are brief and fleeting (Noë et al., 2000) or 
because observers form representations of pre- and post-change objects but fail to compare them 
(Simons & Rensink, 2005b).  The current set of experiments do not support the theory of brief 
representations because the participants demonstrated retained representations of pre-change 
objects over the course of several minutes.  Although these results fit better under the failure-to-
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compare theory, to truly evaluate the theory a better experimental manipulation would be to 
replace the pre-change object with a post-change object, as performed by Mitroff et al., (2004).  
However, this manipulation would not be as appropriate at simulating the conditions of divided 
perception, so it was not included in this study. 
Applying the Change Blindness Paradigm to the Study of Divided Perception Theory 
As discussed earlier, a change detection task was used in these experiments as a means 
of simulating conditions of divided perception.  Clearly, change blindness is not the same 
phenomenon as divided perception, but they share similarities.  For example, both involve 
manipulations of attention.  While change blindness has been shown to depend heavily on where 
the observer directs attention (Rensink, 2002), Divided Perception is more similar to being 
distracted by something.  Brown (2004) describes having one‘s attention quickly drawn away 
from the object by some internal or external distraction.  Thus, both types of tasks prevent the 
object from fully entering consciousness, and the change detection task incorporates elements 
from both experiences.  Correctly determining the location of the change is a measure of where 
attention is being focused, while the external distraction is simulated by limiting presentation 
durations of critical items to 2 seconds. 
One difference between change blindness and divided perception is that change 
blindness merely allows for some degree of encoding of the critical item, although at levels lower 
than detected items.  Divided perception, on the other hand, is supposed to lead to extremely high 
levels of familiarity—higher than those obtained in the current experiments.  Perhaps one reason 
for this difference is due to source attribution (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay 1993).  It is 
possible that in real-life instances of divided perception, the source of the familiarity may be 
unapparent, so the déjà vu experient attributes the familiarity to some other source (such as a 
dream).  However, in a laboratory-based change blindness experience, even though the 
participant does not recall seeing the changing object before, it is easy to think of a source for the 
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familiarity—the study list that occurred earlier in the experiment (although the participant may 
not be aware of the specific experimental source).  This is in line with Jacoby and Whitehouse‘s 
(1989) claim that items are only falsely recognized if the participant is unaware of the source of 
the familiarity, as well as Whittlesea‘s discrepancy-attribution hypothesis, that states that 
fluently-processed items are only interpreted as familiar if the fluency is somehow surprising in 
that context (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000).  A major goal of future work on Divided Perception 
theory should be to investigate situations that would evoke higher feelings of familiarity for 
undetected items than detected ones, possibly with uncertainty as to their source (or lead to 
attributions of familiarity to extra-experimental sources).  It is also important to keep in mind that 
divided perception is currently a theoretical cause of déjà vu, and most of the evidence for it is 
anecdotal, not empirical.  Therefore, demonstrating that divided perception can lead to strong (as 
opposed to slightly increased) feelings of familiarity is an important future step in supporting 
Divided Perception theory as a potential explanation of déjà vu.  Finally, to ultimately produce 
déjà vu experiences in a lab setting, a paradigm must evoke high feelings of familiarity 
accompanied by the sensation that the experience is objectively new. 
Alternative Theories of Déjà vu 
The Divided Perception theory of déjà vu is not the only theory of why déjà vu occurs.  
Brown (2003) suggests several alternative potential explanations, ranging from memory-based 
theories to biologically-based theories.   
The Single-Element theory proposes that déjà vu arises when one encounters an object 
one has seen before in a different context.  For example, a man might visit his friend‘s new house, 
and the house seems very familiar.  The man could not have visited the house before because his 
friend just moved in.  Unbeknownst to the man, his friend bought a new lamp which looks 
exactly like one the man had seen ten years earlier, and the familiarity from the lamp causes the 
entire environment to seem more familiar.   Brown and Marsh (2007) found support for this 
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theory by showing that the familiarity of one symbol can affect the familiarity of adjacent 
symbols, such that the familiarity of one item can make other symbols in the area more or less 
familiar, in the same way that the familiarity from a previously-encountered lamp can diffuse into 
other parts of the environment.    
In contrast, the Global Configuration theory proposes that déjà vu arises when one 
encounters a similar configuration of a scene, such as a room, in a different context.  For 
example, two rooms may have different colors, different pieces of furniture, and even different 
styles, but similarities in the arrangements of each room‘s contents may produce a feeling of déjà 
vu.  Cleary et al. (2009) investigated this possibility by producing line drawings of different 
scenes that shared similar configurations but different items.  Participants studied a list of line 
drawings with names, and then received a test list of different line drawings in which half the test 
items shared a configuration with a studied line drawing and half did not.  The results showed that 
when participants could not recall the name of the studied scene that a test scene resembled, 
familiarity ratings were higher for test scenes that configurally resembled studied scenes than for 
test scenes whose configurations did not resemble any studied scenes.  Participants were even 
more likely to report being in a déjà vu state in response to test scenes that shared configurations 
with studies scenes. 
A third theory--the Biological Dysfunction theory--invokes a neurological explanation, 
suggesting that déjà vu arises from a brief change in neural transmission speed.  When the brain 
receives sensory input, those sensory signals can take multiple pathways from the sensory organ 
to higher-level cortical centers.  These multiple pathways may usually take about the same time to 
reach a destination, or some normal lag between the two identical signals.  But if one signal 
should take longer than usual, when it finally reaches its destination it will have been preceded by 
an identical signal.  The second signal may then be interpreted as familiar, because something 
exactly the same was perceived milliseconds earlier.  It has long been known that déjà vu 
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experiences are associated with the pre-seizure aura in epileptics (e.g., Bowles et al., 2007), and 
potential support for this theory has come from a study showing that temporal-lobe epileptics 
experience déjà vu as part of the pre-seizure aura regardless of perceptual input, suggesting that 
déjà vu experiences can arise purely from anomalous electrical activity in the brain (O‘Connor & 
Moulin, 2008). 
Although these theories are all somewhat different from each other, the fact that several 
disparate theories have been proposed to explain déjà vu does not pose a problem for the 
theoretical interpretation of the current set of results because the different theories are not 
mutually exclusive.  It is possible that each of the theories could be valid descriptions of different 
ways to create déjà vu experiences.  It is even possible that the set of conditions described in each 
theory could give rise to a set of subjectively similar experiences that are collectively grouped as 
déjà vu.  There is still much research to be done on these theories, as well as Divided Perception, 
and in the future one goal can be to evaluate and compare the nature of déjà vu states elicited 
under different theoretical frameworks. 
Limitations of the Current Study 
 There are a number of shortcomings in the current set of experiments.  The largest and 
most problematic is that the change detection task used in all experiments may not actually 
produce the intended state of divided perception.  This problem is unavoidable, as there is no 
formal definition of what divided perception is, apart from the descriptions provided by Brown 
(2003, 2004).  However, even if divided perception did have a more concrete definition, there is 
always a difference between a real-world phenomenon and a lab-based procedure to produce that 
phenomenon.  In spite of the differences, a change detection task has strong potential for creating 
an appropriate approximation of divided perception because they both involve the role of 
attention.  Brown (2003) notes that divided perception stems from a failure to fully attend to an 
object, and Rensink et al., (1997, 2000) note that change blindness also results from failure to 
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fully attend to an object.  This suggests that change blindness is conceptually similar to divided 
perception and can be an effective means of creating divided perception in the lab. 
 Another potential problem is that the description of divided perception takes place in a 
naturalistic setting, while the current set of experiments sought to re-create the conditions in a 
lab-based setting.  This pertains to the tradeoff between experimental control and ecological 
validity in research (Banaji & Crowder, 1989), but it also has an added complication regarding 
the change detection task.  Levin et al. (2002) failed to find evidence of recognition for 
undetected objects in a real-life change detection task, while Angelone et al. (2003) did find 
evidence of recognition in a lab-based change detection task.  The two studies employed similar 
procedures and even involved the same group of researchers, yet found contrasting results.  The 
explanation offered by Angelone et al. is that anticipation for the change may cause observers to 
attend to and encode to more details of the scene.  As the current set of experiments informed 
participants that a change would take place on every trial, future research involving real-life or 
incidental change detection would be needed to confirm the findings, and this would be an 
essential replication to support the possibility that real-life instances of divided perception could 
lead to déjà vu. 
 Finally, this research approaches recognition memory from a dual-process theory, which 
asserts that recollection and familiarity are two separate processes that can independently lead to 
a recognition decision (Yonelinas, 2002).  An opposing theoretical perspective claims that 
recognition decisions are based on a single process, in which the strength of a memory signal is 
compared against a decision criterion for what constitutes a previously-encountered item (Wixted, 
2007).  The current experiments use procedures and measures derived from dual-process 
approaches to recognition (Cleary & Greene, 2000), and thus were interpreted under that 
framework.  However, it bears mentioning that the results could potentially be interpreted under a 
single-process framework, especially as the difference in ratings between Detected, Undetected, 
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and Unstudied items could suggest varying degrees of memory strength.  Such an interpretation 
would not necessarily preclude the possibility that divided perception could lead to déjà vu, but 
might require modifications to the theoretical explanation of déjà vu.   
Future Directions 
 The current experiments are the first examination of the Divided Perception theory of 
déjà vu, but as is often the case in science, the conclusions have opened several avenues for future 
investigations.  For déjà vu research, an important next step would be to demonstrate recognition 
for undetected items under conditions when a change does not occur on every trial, and perhaps 
even under conditions of incidental change detection or real-life situations.  This would be an 
important step toward determining how déjà vu occurs in natural settings.  Toward this end, a 
very important step would be to show how divided perception can lead to the high levels of 
familiarity characteristic of déjà vu states.  Perhaps this could be accomplished by variations to 
the change detection task, such as shorter exposure durations or inducing divided attention during 
change detection.  Introducing delays between study and test of a week or longer was part of 
Brown and Marsh‘s (2008) procedure for creating feelings of déjà vu, and the same manipulation 
might increase familiarity under divided perception, as well. 
 As stated earlier, there are other theories as to why déjà vu occurs.  It remains to be seen 
which of these theories is correct, and if several methods are capable of producing feelings of 
déjà vu, how they relate to one another.  If there are different causes of déjà vu, it would be 
interesting to examine individual differences in terms of whether an experient is equally likely to 
experience déjà vu from each cause. 
 This research also opens the door towards investigating recognition in change blindness 
from a dual-process approach of recognition memory.  The current results suggest the role of two 
processes, but do not rule out the possibility that a single process could explain the pattern of 
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results, and future research could focus more on how observers make recognition decisions for 
undetected objects. 
Concluding Remarks 
 The current set of experiments used a change detection task to examine recognition 
memory under conditions of divided perception.  The overall conclusions are that observers can 
experience familiarity for items even without sufficient focused attention to detect the items when 
they disappeared from a scene.  These experiments build off prior work showing recognition of 
undetected items, in that they show how the processes of recollection and familiarity are involved 
in the recognition decisions.  These results also show support for the possibility that déjà vu can 
result from conditions of seeing an object without fully attending to it.  These results do not show 
high levels of familiarity normally associated with déjà vu experiences, but they do show that 
familiarity is possible for unattended objects, and future modifications to this procedure could 
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